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THE INTERNET OF TORTS: EXPANDING
CIVIL LIABILITY STANDARDS TO ADDRESS
CORPORATE REMOTE INTERFERENCE
REBECCA CROOTOF†
ABSTRACT
Thanks to the proliferation of internet-connected devices that
constitute the “Internet of Things” (“IoT”), companies can now
remotely and automatically alter or deactivate household items. In
addition to empowering industry at the expense of individuals, this
remote interference can cause property damage and bodily injury when
an otherwise operational car, alarm system, or implanted medical
device abruptly ceases to function.
Even as the potential for harm escalates, contract and tort law work
in tandem to shield IoT companies from liability. Exculpatory clauses
limit civil remedies, IoT devices’ bundled object/service nature thwarts
implied warranty claims, and contractual notice of remote interference
precludes common law tort suits. Meanwhile, absent a better
understanding of how IoT-enabled injuries operate and propagate,
judges are likely to apply products liability and negligence standards
narrowly, in ways that curtail corporate liability.
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But this is hardly the first time a new technology has altered social
and power relations between industries and individuals, creating a
potential liability inflection point. As before, we must decide what to
incentivize and who to protect, with an awareness that the choices we
make now will shape future assumptions about IoT companies’
obligations and consumer rights. Accordingly, this Article proposes
reforms to contract and tort law to expand corporate liability and
minimize foreseeable consumer injury.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ............................................................................................ 585
I. A New Corporation–Consumer Relationship................................ 593
A. An Exacerbated Power Imbalance .................................... 595
1. Intensified Corporate-Compliance Monitoring ............. 596
2. Facilitating (Automated) Corporate Remote
Interference ......................................................................600
3. Enabling Corporate Self-Help.........................................602
B. A New Vector for Harm ..................................................... 606
II. Barriers to Civil Liability Suits ....................................................... 610
A. Contractual Obstacles.......................................................... 611
1. Exculpatory and Other Liability-Limiting Clauses .......612
2. Warranty Claims ...............................................................618
3. Trespass to Chattels and Conversion ..............................619
B. Products Liability Problems ................................................ 622
C. Negligence Hurdles: Unclear Duties, Unclear Breaches 627
D. Seeming Breaks in the Causal Chain ................................. 632
1. Intervening Causes of Harm Versus Enabling Acts ...... 634
2. Technology Deflects Responsibility ................................636
E. A Market for Unsafe Remote Interference ...................... 638
III. A Civil Liability Inflection Point .................................................. 641
A. Evolutionary Moments........................................................ 642
1. The Industrial Revolution and Decreased Industry
Liability............................................................................642
2. Mass Manufacturing and an Expansion in Industry
Liability............................................................................644
B. Expanding Corporate Liability ........................................... 646
1. Limiting Corporate Exculpatory Clauses.......................646
a. Strengthening Unconscionability Claims ..................647
b. A Public Policy Argument .........................................648
2. Broadening Relational Duties ......................................... 649
a. An Implied Warranty of Reasonable Interference ...652

2019]

THE INTERNET OF TORTS

585

b. Interference Defects .................................................... 654
c. IoT Fiduciaries ............................................................ 656
3. Extending Causation ........................................................ 658
C. Implementation .................................................................... 660
1. Judicial, Legislative, and Agency Rulemaking .............. 660
2. Federal and State Lawmaking ......................................... 665
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 666

INTRODUCTION
Missing a payment on your leased car was once the first step of an
extended, multistage negotiation between you and a lender, bounded
by enforcement costs, contract law, and consumer protection rules.1
Today, however, car companies are using starter-interrupt devices to
remotely “boot” cars just days after a payment is missed.2 This self-help
practice is currently lawful and provides significant cost savings to
businesses, but it creates an obvious risk of injury when an otherwise
operational car does not work as expected. There have been reports of
parents unable to take children to the emergency room, individuals
marooned in dangerous neighborhoods, and people whose cars were
disabled while idling in an intersection.3
This is but one of many examples of how internet-connected
devices, collectively referred to as the “Internet of Things” (“IoT”),
allow companies to engage in remote interference—the practice of
employing an over-the-air update to remotely alter or deactivate a
physical device. After identifying this contractually legitimized vector
for harm and discussing why our current civil liability regime is illsuited to regulate it, this Article proposes legal reforms to expand
corporate liability and minimize foreseeable user injury. Enacting
1. Usually, the practical difficulties and costs associated with repossession result in lenders
waiting to take action until after two or more consecutive missed monthly payments. Some states
require creditors to give notice before repossessing a car, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 537.012(2) (2017),
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255B, § 20A(c) (2017); others grant car lessors in default the right to
reinstate their loans or otherwise cure the default, see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255B, § 20A(c)
(2017), ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 5-110 (2017). While many states permit lenders to repossess a car a
day after a loan default, they are constrained by an obligation to not breach the peace. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 11-9-609 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-609 (2013).
2. See Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Miss a Payment? Good Luck Moving
That Car, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014, 9:33 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/miss-apayment-good-luck-moving-that-car [https://perma.cc/2YF4-EHZB] (describing a lender who
“remotely activated a device . . . that prevented [a lessor’s] car from starting”).
3. Id.
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these suggestions will foster a powerful regulatory and social-norms
feedback loop, shaping our future assumptions about IoT companies’
obligations and consumer rights.
Thanks to recent technological advances, it is increasingly easy to
add sensors and wireless capabilities into more and more items,
allowing companies to transform innumerable once-“dumb” items into
“smart” IoT devices.4 As this Article is concerned with the issue of
consumer physical harm, it focuses on IoT devices intended for
individual and household use. These include both relatively
independent gadgets—like an implantable medical device, wearable
step tracker, smart appliance, or vehicle—and integration systems—
like a smart-home hub that networks lights, entertainment, and
environmental controls.5
The ongoing connection between these devices and IoT
companies6 allows for corporate remote interference, which can
benefit both industry and individuals: over-the-air updates can address
bugs, protect against discovered malware, correct cyber vulnerabilities,
enable new capabilities,7 or even save lives.8 The ability to remotely
alter IoT devices also reduces industry costs of complying with

4. This bent has sparked Twitter feeds like @internetofshit, which catalogs excessively
connected products, including IoT doghouses, coffee mugs, sex toys, jean jackets, condoms, and
fidget spinners. See generally Internet of Shit (@internetofshit), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/internetofshit?lang=en [https://perma.cc/JFJ6-3RYZ].
5. The full Internet of Things includes implantables, devices, vehicles, building and
logistical systems, and other physical items with sensors, software, and network connectivity that
enable data collection and sharing.
6. While acknowledging that it will not always be accurate or appropriate to lump different
entities together, this Article uses “IoT companies” as shorthand that includes IoT device
manufacturers, distributers, and cloud-based service providers.
7. Tesla, for example, anticipates using software updates to gradually improve cars’ selfdriving capabilities. See generally Sheikh v. Tesla, No. 17-CV-02193-BLF, 2018 WL 5794532 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 2, 2018) (upholding the settlement agreement in a class action lawsuit against Tesla for
its delayed rollout of Enhanced Autopilot features).
8. In response to a May 2018 Consumer Reports’ allegation that Tesla Model 3’s stopping
distance was worse than any other contemporary car, Tesla pushed an over-the-air software
update that improved the car’s braking distance by nineteen feet, undoubtedly saving lives. Sean
O’Kane, Tesla Can Change So Much with Over-the-Air Updates That It’s Messing with Some
Owners’ Heads, VERGE (June 2, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/2/17413732/teslaover-the-air-software-updates-brakes [https://
perma.cc/5XGX-A9HV]; see also Brian Dolan, Prediction: Health Wearable to Save 1.3 Million
(Dec.
16,
2014),
Lives
by
2020,
MOBIHEALTHNEWS
http://www.mobihealthnews.com/39062/prediction-health-wearables-to-save-1-3-million-livesby-2020 [https://perma.cc/7DN8-2H4D].
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changing regulations,9 monitoring compliance with terms and
conditions, and enforcing consequences for contractual breaches.10
Companies may pass these savings on to consumers in the form of
cheaper products or a greater willingness to extend credit to riskier
borrowers.11 For example, the ability to remotely boot a car reduces
the need for physical repossessions, minimizing the potential for
embarrassment, trespass, or breaches of the peace and the attendant
physical risks to repossession agents, consumers, and bystanders.12
The benefits of corporate remote interference are widely touted,
but the drawbacks are less obvious. Some scholars and commentators
are detailing how connected items create consumer-privacy issues and
underappreciated economic harms,13 and others are discussing how IoT
devices’ malfunctions or weak cybersecurity create an increased risk of

9. This, in turn, makes it easier to regulate internet-connected devices, as Jonathan Zittrain
predicted a decade ago. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO
STOP IT 103 (2008).
10. E.g., Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2.
11. Starter-interrupt devices, for example, enable high-risk borrowers to qualify for cars they
might not otherwise have been able to lease. See id.
12. Granted, consumers might experience remote interference as far more invasive than
traditional repossessions. In many states, repossession agents cannot trespass on private property,
even to retrieve secured collateral. Remote interference permits a company to “reach inside” an
individual’s home to alter household devices. As Professor Julie Cohen has observed while
discussing industry interference with digital files, “Plainly, the nonviolent nature of electronic selfhelp—not to mention electronic ‘regulation’ of performance—does not negate its invasiveness
from the consumer’s perspective.” Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help,
13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1105 (1998); see also id. at 1102 (“Courts . . . have not explained,
because they have not needed to, whether the judicially-developed ‘breach of the peace’ standard
is only designed to minimize the likelihood of physical violence and harm to persons and property,
or is (or should be) more broadly concerned with preventing nonconsensual intrusion . . . .”). As
a hypothetical, she imagines a high-tech repo team with the ability to “beam” a contested item
out of a living room and argues that it would be difficult to claim that no intrusion had occurred.
Id. at 1106. An IoT company’s ability to remotely interfere with an item is akin to Cohen’s
imagined invasive “beaming” it out: in both cases, the consumer can no longer make use of a
purchased item in their home.
13. See generally, e.g., Alan Butler, Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure) Things:
Should Manufacturers Be Liable for Damage Caused by Hacked Devices?, 50 U. MICH. J. LAW
REFORM 913 (2017); Margot E. Kaminski, Matthew Rueben, William D. Smart & Cindy M.
Grimm, Averting Robot Eyes, 76 MD. L. REV. 983, 984 (2017); Christina Mulligan, Personal
Property Servitudes on the Internet of Things, 50 GA. L. REV. 1121, 1163–65 (2016) [hereinafter
Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes]; Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First
Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85
(2014); Richard L. Rutledge, Aaron K. Massey, Annie I. Antón & Peter Swire, Clarifying the
Internet of Things by Defining the Internet of Devices (2010) (unpublished manuscript),
https://peterswire.net/wp-content/uploads/Clarifying-the-Internet-of-Things-by-Defining-theInternet-of-Devices.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4NR-88NA].
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physical harm.14 These topics deserve attention—not least because
standing rules and the economic-loss doctrine bar many suits that
would otherwise result in liability for IoT companies—but the focus on
privacy, cybersecurity, and criminal hacks has obscured the increased
risk of physical harm from nonaccidental corporate acts.
This is the first law review article to discuss how the benefits of
unconstrained corporate remote interference may come at the expense
of consumers’ physical safety.15 Because IoT devices interact with and
affect our physical environment, corporate remote interference can
foreseeably cause physical harm. Your oven turning on unexpectedly

14. See, e.g., BENJAMIN C. DEAN, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 1 (2018) (discussing how insecure IoT
devices may enable new vectors for physical harms); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INTERNET
OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 12 (2015) [hereinafter FTC
REPORT] (“[U]nauthorized persons might exploit security vulnerabilities to create risks to
physical safety in some cases.”); U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, TORTS OF THE
FUTURE: ADDRESSING THE LIABILITY AND REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES 42–43 (2017); Sara Sun Beale & Peter Berris, Hacking the Internet of Things:
Vulnerabilities, Dangers, and Legal Responses, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 161, 163–66 (2018)
(describing instances where IoT devices or systems have been hacked or could be hacked to cause
physical and financial harm, including hacks into the healthcare system, automated railways,
smart automobiles, aviation technology, and dams); Butler, supra note 13; Stacy-Ann Elvy,
Hybrid Transactions and the INTERNET of Things: Goods, Services, or Software?, 74 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 77, 118 (2017); Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things:
Discrimination, Privacy, and Cybersecurity in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENVER L. REV.
87, 109 (2018); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1909–12 (2019)
(discussing how IoT household devices can be hijacked by domestic abusers, creating a new
avenue for invasion of sexual privacy).
15. Of course, harmful remote interference is far from the only issue associated with the
growing IoT ecosystem. Recent scholarship has highlighted IoT devices’ extensive cybersecurity
problems. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Security and the Internet of Things, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(Feb. 1, 2017, 8:24 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/02/security_and_th.html
[https://perma.cc/BET8-UXXA] (stating that, because “[a]ll computers are hackable,” we “need
to reverse the trend to connect everything to the internet”). Others have highlighted the IoT’s
attendant national security and international security risks. See generally Laura DeNardis & Mark
Raymond, The Internet of Things as a Global Policy Frontier, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 475 (2017)
(discussing global policy concerns); Ido Kilovaty, Freedom To Hack, 80 OHIO STATE L.J. 455
(2019) (proposing legal remedies to address IoT security concerns). Scholars have also raised
concerns about how the IoT enables expanded law enforcement and industry surveillance, see,
e.g., ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 109–10; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the
Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 812 (2016); Steven I. Friedland, Drinking
from the Fire Hose: How Massive Self-Surveillance from the Internet of Things is Changing the
Face of Privacy, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 891, 907–11 (2017), and increases opportunities for
surreptitious consumer manipulation, see, e.g., Ryan Calo, Tiny Salespeople: Mediated
Transactions and the Internet of Things, 2013 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 70, 70 (2013). See
generally Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014) (detailing
how collected information can be used to manipulate consumer choice).
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increases the risk of a house fire;16 your car turning off unexpectedly
increases the risk that you will be stranded in a dangerous area.17 You
trust an IoT baby monitor, senior lifeline, home-security system, or fire
alarm to notify you of a problem—but should a software update disable
the alert system without warning, your reliance could lead to tragedy.18
Your garage or front door could be left open, inviting theft or assault,
in retaliation for a bad review of a smart lock on Amazon.19 And
implantable IoT medical devices—like pacemakers and insulin
pumps—make the physical risks of remote deactivation all the more
visceral.20
In short, this technology increases consumer risk without a
corresponding increase in corporate liability. Given how IoT devices
increasingly affect our environment and bodies, the potential
magnitude and kinds of harm from corporate remote interference are
significant; given that the digital nature of the IoT enables relatively
costless and automated action, the potential scale of these harms is
staggering. Meanwhile, IoT companies are creating, monitoring, and
enforcing contractual-governance regimes with few legal incentives to
ensure foreseeable harms are avoided. Finally, absent a better
understanding of how IoT-enabled injuries operate and propagate,
judges will likely apply products liability and negligence standards in
ways that minimize corporate liability. Thus, the actual harm individual
consumers experience is familiar—after all, repossessed cars have
never been able to take children to emergency rooms, and
16. Ashley Carman, Smart Ovens Have Been Turning on Overnight and Preheating to 400
Degrees, VERGE (Aug. 14, 2019, 2:54 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/14/20802774/junesmart-oven-remote-preheat-update-user-error [https://perma.cc/ZE2Z-ASUW].
17. Stephen Ellison, Tesla’s App Goes Down for Hours, Leaving Some Stranded, NBC (Sept.
2, 2019, 8:41 PM), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Teslas-App-Goes-Down-For-HoursLeaving-Some-Stranded-559215411.html [https://perma.cc/7RMS-4GR7].
18. See, e.g., Ed Harding, Foxborough Family Says Home Medical Alert System Failed Loved
One, WCVB (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.wcvb.com/article/foxborough-family-says-homemedical-alert-system-failed-loved-one/8207243 [https://perma.cc/UMJ6-GUDE] (reporting that
a woman, wearing a medical alert system designed to automatically sense and report falls, fell
without an alert being issued and later died of unknown causes).
19. See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (discussing how the owner and distributer
of an IoT garage-door opener responded to a poor Amazon review by deactivating the customer’s
device).
20. See, e.g., Ian Kerr, The Internet of People? Reflections on the Future Regulation of
Human-Implantable Radio Frequency Identification, in LESSONS FROM THE IDENTITY TRAIL:
ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY 341–43 (Ian Kerr, Valerie Steeves & Carole Lucock eds.,
2009). See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Michael Mattioli, Steve Myers & Austin Brady, Securing
the Internet of Healthcare, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 405, 407 (2018) (discussing the cybersecurity
and privacy “vulnerabilities replete in the supply chain for medical devices”).
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malfunctioning alert systems or medical devices have long caused
injuries. But our current civil liability system is ill-equipped to address
this new vector for harm. To correct this imbalance, this Article
proposes expanding liability for harms resulting from corporate remote
interference.
Part I introduces IoT devices and discusses how these internetconnected objects foster a new ongoing and intimate relationship
between IoT companies and users, characterized both by an increased
power differential and an increased risk of harm.21 Companies can
harness IoT devices’ extensive surveillance capabilities22 to monitor
consumer compliance with contractual terms—written by and for the
company23—and employ strategic remote interference to extort
concessions and engage in self-help enforcement.24 Critically, and in
contrast to prior forms of electronic self-help, corporate remote
interference with IoT devices can cause property and bodily harm. If,
as Ryan Calo has quipped, robots are “software that can touch you,”25
IoT devices are contracts that can hurt you.
Part II discusses how contract and tort law work in tandem to
shield companies from liability for the harms caused by their remote
interference.26 Unsophisticated consumers agree to nonnegotiated
21. See Elvy, supra note 14, at 91–93 (describing the new type of continuous and asymmetric
relationship between IoT companies and their customers). This relationship is further
complicated by the fact that devices are increasingly licensed, rather than sold. For considerations
of the various social and legal implications of increasingly licensed items, see generally JOSHUA
A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY AND THE NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM (2017);
AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL PROPERTY IN
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016); Christina Mulligan, Licenses and the Property/Contract Interface,
93 IND. L.J. 1073 (2018); Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 13; Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008).
22. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill & Surya Mattu, The House That Spied on Me, GIZMODO (Feb. 7,
2018,
1:25
PM),
https://gizmodo.com/the-house-that-spied-on-me-1822429852
[https://perma.cc/H7WV-HDZH].
23. See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing how GPS trackers are being used to determine if rental
and leased cars are driven outside of permitted areas).
24. See infra Part I.A.3 (recounting how remote interference enables corporate self-help).
25. RYAN CALO, BROOKINGS, THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL ROBOTICS COMMISSION 5
(2014).
26. Contracts, intellectual property, and cyberlaw scholars have mapped out issues raised
when companies use terms of service and technological self-help to sidestep consumer protections
in the digital context. See generally, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012) [hereinafter RADIN, BOILERPLATE];
Cohen, supra note 12, at 1103; Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by
Machine, 160 J. INST. THEO. ECON. 143 (2004) [hereinafter Radin, Regulation by Contract]. This
Article builds on this scholarship in describing how IoT devices increase both companies’ ability
to surveil consumers and the risk of physical harm.
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terms of service, which notify them of the possibility of remote
interference and purport to limit corporate liability for its
consequences.27 Even if a court determines that a liability-limiting
clause is invalid as unconscionable or contrary to public policy, IoT
devices’ bundled goods/services nature thwart breach of warranty
claims,28 while the contractual notification precludes other common
law tort suits.29 Meanwhile, none of the products liability standards
map well onto these situations, and the duty analysis for a negligence
claim is confused by tempting but misleading analogies. Further, for
both products liability and negligence actions, the causal chain may
appear tenuous. Not only can corporate remote interference facilitate
accidental and criminal intervening sources of harm, it also shifts
responsibility to those intervening sources.30 This allows companies to
evade the reputational costs that might otherwise attend dramatic
injuries resulting from remote interference, limiting the market’s
ability to address this problem—indeed, if anything, it encourages a
market for lemons.31 In short, remote interference has foreseeable,
harmful consequences, but our current civil liability regime is unlikely
to hold IoT companies sufficiently accountable.
But, as discussed in Part III, law can evolve. Civil liability
standards regularly change in the wake of technological development,
new sources of harm, and attendant shifts in power and social
relations.32 The proliferation of IoT devices heralds another possible
27. See infra Part II.A.1 (providing examples of IoT exculpatory clauses).
28. See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining why U.C.C. implied warranties will not attach to many
IoT devices).
29. See infra Part II.A.3 (arguing that notification will bar trespass to chattels and conversion
claims).
30. See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing how autonomous-vehicle accidents are often attributed
to others involved in the accidents, rather than to the companies who fielded a vehicle that cannot
engage in actions that would be expected of a human driver).
31. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (arguing that “good” products are crowded out by
“bad” ones when consumers cannot distinguish between high- and low-quality (or safe and
unsafe) versions).
32. Tort law scholars and legal historians regularly discuss the social and legal impacts of
new technologies; this Article continues that tradition with a focus on the relational and power
shifts facilitated by IoT devices. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY (1980); P.H. WINFIELD, A TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORT (5th ed. 1950); JOHN
FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS,
AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004) [hereinafter WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC];
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the
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liability inflection point,33 the outcome of which will determine our
future basic assumptions about IoT companies’ obligations and
consumer rights. In one potential timeline, consumers will continue to
bear the brunt of harms resulting from corporate remote interference,
and consumer expectations regarding corporate duties—or lack
thereof—will develop accordingly. In another, preferable future,
liability will be allocated in a more balanced way, and consumers will
reasonably expect companies to take steps to prevent foreseeable
harms.
Part III concludes by outlining various routes toward expanding
corporate liability for harms resulting from remote interference. In
some situations, it may be sufficient to adopt more expansive
understandings of existing tech-neutral doctrine; in others, it may be
clarifying to articulate tech-specific rules. This Article discusses the
relative benefits of strengthening the unconscionability and public
policy doctrines to limit the reach of exculpatory clauses; recognizing
broader relational duties, which might take the form of a new implied
warranty, a new products liability claim, or a new informal fiduciary
duty; and extending proximate cause standards.34 It closes with a
Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007); Donald G. Gifford, Technological
Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam Locomotives, Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident
Compensation, 11 J. TORT L. 71, 123–29 (2018); Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and
Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1241 (2012); John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort
Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690 (2001)
[hereinafter Witt, Toward a New History].
33. Professor Douglas Kysar has discussed how new technologies and social facts may spur
the development of new liability theories:
Just as railroad and workplace carnage forced recognition of new forms of risk in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, just as automobile and product-caused accidents
illuminated extended chains of responsibility in the twentieth century, climate change
will challenge prevailing conceptions of wrongdoing in the twenty-first century.
Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (2011).
Similarly, the changed corporation–consumer relationship enabled by IoT devices may justify an
expanded liability analysis.
34. In doing so, this Article contributes to a growing body of scholarship on how increasingly
connected, automated, and even autonomous systems challenge or alter liability standards. See
generally, e.g., Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513 (2015);
Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State Accountability in Cyberspace, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 565 (2018); Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous
Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347 (2016); Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous
Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L.
REV. 1611 (2017); F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulating,
and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1839–43 (2014); Curtis E. A. Karnow, The Application of
Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied Machine Intelligence, in ROBOT LAW 51 (Ryan Calo, A.
Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016); Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming
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discussion of how courts, legislatures, and agencies at both the state
and federal levels can complement each other in implementing these
recommendations.
Calibrated correctly, our civil liability regime can evolve to
preserve the benefits of remote interference and ensure that IoT
companies are incentivized to better protect consumers.
I. A NEW CORPORATION–CONSUMER RELATIONSHIP
While there is no agreed-upon definition for the “Internet of
Things,”35 everyone can agree there are a lot of them. And the already
mind-boggling number of internet-connected devices is expected to
skyrocket as companies slap sensors and wireless capabilities onto
more and more items. A 2015 McKinsey Report estimated that “there
are more than nine billion connected devices around the world,
including smartphones and computers,” and that by 2025 there may be
somewhere between twenty-five to fifty billion such devices.36 Others
predict that there will be more than one trillion IoT devices by 2025.37
As this Article considers the problem of consumer harm, it focuses on
the millions of IoT devices marketed for individual or household use
rather than public or industrial IoT systems, such as smart city or

Collision Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321
(2012); Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1 (2017) [hereinafter Smith, Automated Driving]; Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity Driven
Liability, 102 GEO. L.J. 1777 (2014) [hereinafter Smith, Proximity Driven Liability]; David C.
Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 117 (2014); William D. Smart, Cindy M. Grimm & Woodrow Hartzog, An Education
Theory of Fault for Autonomous Systems (Aug. 29, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
http://people.oregonstate.edu/~smartw/library/papers/2017/werobot2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G56E-AHNJ].
35. A Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) report describes the IoT as encompassing
“‘things’ such as devices or sensors—other than computers, smartphones or tablets—that connect,
communicate or transmit information with or between each other through the Internet.” FTC
REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. A McKinsey report defined it as “sensors and actuators connected
by networks to computing systems . . . . exclud[ing] systems in which all of the sensors’ primary
purpose is to receive intentional human input.” MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, THE INTERNET
OF THINGS: MAPPING THE VALUE BEYOND THE HYPE 1 (2015) [hereinafter MCKINSEY
REPORT]. Delightfully, some have described IoT devices as “enchanted objects”—“ordinary
things made extraordinary.” DAVID ROSE, ENCHANTED OBJECTS: DESIGN, HUMAN DESIRE,
AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 7 (2014).
36. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 35, at 17.
37. Bill Wasik, In the Programmable World, All Our Objects Will Act as One, WIRED (May
14, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/05/internet-of-things-2 [https://perma.cc/UG4T-RXV7].
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factory logistical, monitoring, or maintenance systems.38 This subset of
IoT devices represents a significant percentage of the IoT ecosystem:
it is estimated to have an economic impact of $370 billion to $1.9 trillion
per year by 2025.39
An IoT device’s distinctive fusion of traits—its ability to collect
personal data, its capacity for ongoing communication with an IoT
company, and its physicality—combine to form a product that is
simultaneously an object and a service.40 An IoT speaker might double
as a smart-home hub or link with a voice-activated, cloud-based service
to provide requested content. A smart thermostat develops customized
energy-saving heating plans and a monthly energy report. An internetconnected vehicle offers built-in navigation, roadside assistance, or
real-time alerts regarding engine, emission, or airbag status. Water
bottles can track your daily water intake, egg monitors can send
reminders that eggs are going bad, and tires can alert you if they
become deflated.41 Medical wearables and implantables allow for

38. This Article regularly refers to Nest, Google’s smart-home hub, GOOGLE NEST,
https://store.google.com/us/category/connected_home?hl=enUS&GoogleNest&utm_source=nest_
redirect&utm_medium=google_oo&utm_campaign=GS102776&utm_term=control
[https://perma.cc/
EDW5-5KJQ]; Alexa Voice Service, Amazon’s cloud-based voice service that links with
ALEXA,
innumerable
devices,
Alexa
Voice
Service,
AMAZON
https://developer.amazon.com/alexa-voice-service [https://perma.cc/S86P-G6TD]; and Tesla, an
automotive and energy car company that specializes in increasingly autonomous vehicles, TESLA,
https://www.tesla.com [https://perma.cc/8UWB-N5TN].
39. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 35, at 7.
40. Elvy, supra note 14, at 144–45 (describing how the IoT has “usher[ed] in an era” of
devices that are both services and goods, and no longer “static objects”). This is related to what
Radin has termed the “contract as product” understanding of contract law, which she defines as
occurring when “the contract is part of the product, part of the collection of functional
components, and not a separate text about that collection.” Margaret Jane Radin, Information
Tangibility, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 395, 410 (Ove Grandstrand,
ed., 2003) [hereinafter Radin, Information Tangibility]. You no longer simply buys a phone: you
buy a phone with specific contractual terms, such as a requirement to litigate disputes in California
under California law. Id. at 411–12. Similarly, with IoT devices, you are not only buying the
device—you are buying the device, the service, and the terms of that service. See id. at 412–14
(discussing how this conflation is undermining the “idea that a contract is a text, separate from
and ‘about’ (accompanying) some machine or functionality”).
41. Note that, despite being about IoT devices, this paper does not use “a fridge ordering
milk” as an example. At least, not anymore. Pzremek Palka, How To Write a Law and Technology
Paper?, PRZEMYSLAW.TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 30, 2018), https://przemyslaw.technology/
2018/11/30/how-to-write-a-law-and-technology-paper [https://perma.cc/PF2X-YCT2].

2019]

THE INTERNET OF TORTS

595

better drug management and the early identification of a need for
intervention.42
As a result, and as detailed more fully below, when you engage
with an IoT device, you do more than just use an item; you enter into
an ongoing and surprisingly intimate relationship with an IoT
company, characterized by a new power dynamic—and a new risk of
property and bodily harm.
A. An Exacerbated Power Imbalance
New technologies giveth, and new technologies taketh away. But
while it is increasingly understood that IoT-enabled services come at
the cost of one’s privacy, it is less recognized that they also come at the
cost of one’s agency.43
IoT devices’ touted provision of individualized services requires
individualized data gathering, which in turn enables individualized
manipulation and individualized enforcement via corporate remote
interference.44 Not only can IoT companies use software and hardware
to limit how consumers can use a device,45 but they can also monitor
compliance with their terms of service, which allows them to
strategically time remote interference to extort concessions or engage

42. See generally Syagnik Banerjee, Thomas A. Hemphill & Phil Longstreet, Is IOT a Threat
to Consumer Consent? The Perils of Wearable Devices’ Health Data Exposure (unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3038872
[https://perma.cc/2WGG-FKE7].
43. Numerous scholars are exploring the implications of increased surveillance for privacy
law and consumer protection law. See supra notes 13–15. See generally Neil M. Richards, The
Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013). This Article is primarily concerned with
how IoT companies are leveraging their surveillance capabilities to exert more control over
consumers.
44. See infra Part I.A.3 (discussing how IoT companies can hold consumer devices hostage
to elicit agreement to new contractual terms and engage in individualized remote interference).
45. Scholars have long detailed how design decisions enable corporate control and limit
consumer uses. See, e.g., HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 224 (Donald Nicholson
Smith trans., 1991) (1984) (observing that what is possible within a space depends on what its
designers want to permit and encourage); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 81–84, 123–37,
323–24, 327–29 (2006) (describing the distinctive characteristics and impacts of architectural
regulation, with a focus on computer code); LUCY A. SUCHMAN, HUMAN-MACHINE
RECONFIGURATIONS 186–92, 257–84 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing how users’ interactions with
technologies are structured by their design); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 210, 225–27 (2007) (arguing that the design of online environments constrict
users’ behavior in much the same way as the design of physical environments); Steve Woolgar,
Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials, in A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON
POWER, TECHNOLOGY, AND DOMINATION 59, 67–69 (John Law ed., 1991) (noting how
technological designs limit users’ activities).
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in self-help. Indeed, given their new powers to monitor, companies may
include previously unthinkable, stringent rules into their contracts,
further directing when and how consumers can use their purchased
devices.
Between contracts replacing “the law of the state with the ‘law’ of
the firm”46 and new technology enabling the law of the surveilling firm,
corporate remote interference systematically empowers IoT
companies at the expense of IoT-device users.47
1. Intensified Corporate-Compliance Monitoring. Companies have
always been able to glean information about their customers from
interactions, but IoT devices are collecting, crunching, and conveying
individualized data on an entirely new scale. They amass a wealth of
aggregate and individually linked data about the most private aspects
of our lives,48 granting IoT companies insight into our routines, habits,
and proclivities; household IoT devices gather and share information
about when you wake up, how long you brush your teeth, when you

46. Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 26, at 143.
47. Id. at 147. Simultaneously, to the extent states co-opt corporate power, internetconnected devices “significantly reduce[] the number and variety of people and institutions
required to apply the state’s power on a mass scale.” ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 118; see, e.g.,
Peter Campbell, Volvo Cars Caps Vehicle Speed To Prevent Road Deaths, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 4,
2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/3c2f66bc-3e61-11e9-9bee-efab61506f44
[https://perma.cc/K3FM-DFFY] (reporting on blanket, GPS-linked electronic speed-limiting and
that Volvo is considering using it to cap vehicle speed near schools and hospitals).
48. Furthermore, most IoT devices marketed for individual and home use collect
information in the home, a traditionally private space. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Robots and Privacy,
in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 187, 188 (Patrick Lin,
George Bekey & Keith Abney eds., 2012).
Certainly, it is technologically possible to have household IoT devices that do not collect
individualized information, do not share it with IoT companies, and are not subject to remote
corporate control. Konnex, for example, is an open standard used for commercial and domestic
building automation that is not linked to an IoT company and does not permit third-party access
or control.
Given the value generated by data sets, however, IoT companies have market incentives
to collect as much information about their users as possible; given various liability risks, they also
have legal incentives to maintain control over the IoT devices. Nor can consumers opt out of these
surveillance systems; most purchase agreements require consumers to consent to data reporting,
and warranties are often conditioned on not tampering with the IoT device. See, e.g., Kashmir
Hill, Nest Hackers Will Offer Tool To Keep the Google-Owned Company from Getting Users’
Data, FORBES (July 16, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/16/nest-hackprivacy-tool/#3b38af583464 [https://
perma.cc/W2RC-FVC3] (reporting on how Nests report household information to Google and
how the device can be altered to prevent it from sending personal data).
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turn your lights on or off, and what shows you watch.49 Although much
of the data is explicitly or implicitly volunteered—after all, individuals
choose to wear fitness trackers or install smart-home hubs50—data
about our lives is increasingly being collected without our knowledge
by our own IoT devices,51 by others’ devices,52 and by public devices.53
IoT and other data-mining companies generate additional information
through data aggregation and extrapolation.54 Between the amount
and kind of data collected, IoT companies now know more personal
details about individual device users than the nosiest small-town
shopkeeper or the most tech-enabled brick-and-mortar store.55
Further, because all IoT devices have transmitters that permit
information sharing,56 they are in regular communication with
49. Hill & Mattu, supra note 22. IoT companies may even use gathered information to mock
you. In December 2017, Netflix tweeted, “To the 53 people who’ve watched A Christmas Prince
every day for the past 18 days: Who hurt you?” Netflix US (@netflix), TWITTER (Dec. 10, 2017,
6:52 PM), https://twitter.com/netflix/status/940051734650503168 [https://perma.cc/SS7V-RYY2].
50. Friedland, supra note 15, at 898.
51. Ferguson, supra note 15, at 822 (noting that “many consumers may not even know they
possess objects that are revealing information about their personal lives”); see also Hudson
Hongo, Smart Sex Toy Maker Sued for Sneakily Collecting ‘Intimate’ Data, GIZMODO (Sept. 12,
2016),
https://gizmodo.com/smart-sex-toy-maker-sued-for-sneakily-collecting-intima1786559792 [https://
perma.cc/7UVA-WTBF] (“In August, hackers at the Def Con security conference revealed that
Standard Innovation’s We-Vibe smart vibrators transmitted user data—including heat level and
vibration intensity—to the company in real time.”); Arvind Narayanan (@random_walker),
(Sept.
27,
2019,
6:08
AM),
https://twitter.com/random_walker/
TWITTER
status/1177570679232876544 [https://perma.cc/TZY2-GTJX] (discussing three papers that detail
how smart TVs and related devices track users).
52. Ferguson, supra note 15, at 811 (“[W]hat we ordinarily think of as static objects will
become communication tools, revealing our paths, interests, habits, and lives to companies and
law enforcers.”).
53. Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 51
IDAHO L. REV. 639, 647 (2015) (“There is no opportunity for notice and choice in smart publics
or any smart shared space.”); see also Siraj Datoo, This Recycling Bin Is Following You, QUARTZ
(Aug. 8, 2013), https://qz.com/112873/this-recycling-bin-is-following-you [https://perma.cc/AVP8UVF6] (noting that London’s smart garbage bins collect data from pedestrians’ smart phones to
create targeted advertisements).
54. As IoT devices collect information on the “micro-patterns” of an individual’s habits, it
will be increasingly possible to predict “future macro-patterns.” Ferguson, supra note 15, at 822.
55. See, e.g., Paul Michael, 8 Ways Retailers Are Tracking Your Every Move, TIME (Sept. 23,
2016), http://time.com/money/4506297/how-retailers-track-you [https://perma.cc/Z28J-76MM]
(reporting on how stores geofence smartphones to identify when individuals approach, enter, and
leave stores).
56. These connectivity structures can take a variety of forms: IoT devices can connect with
and transmit data to other devices, to service providers, or to a hub or gateway, which then
connects to service providers. David Hamilton, The Four Internet of Things Connectivity Models
Explained, WEB HOST INDUSTRY REVIEW (Apr. 29, 2016), available at
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corporate service providers, allowing for real-time monitoring. As
detailed in a recent article about a monitored, IoT-connected home,
smart-home devices persistently contact outside servers.57 Amazon’s
Echo hub connected with company servers every few minutes,58 and
the smart plugs—which merely control and monitor electrical usage—
were “pinging home almost every hour.”59 The latest Roomba creates
maps of owners’ homes, which it then shares with parent companies
iRobot and Google.60 Even seemingly independent IoT devices, like
wearable step trackers, pacemakers, and vehicles, frequently exchange
information with companies to report on usage and receive security
updates.
This near-constant data gathering and transfer enables a new level
of postsale corporate surveillance. Previously, most postsale services
bundled with the sale of a good tended to be limited to relatively
infrequent, known interactions. Installation services are quickly
fulfilled; maintenance services occur at regularly scheduled intervals;
warranty services are only triggered in the event of a malfunction or
defect and are bounded by a known end date. And even though
subscription plans and utilities are provided on a near-constant basis,
consumers’ relationships with utility companies are limited.
Subscribers and property owners are charged at regular intervals,
punctuated with relatively rare as-needed repairs to portions of the
system under the company’s control. Thus, while “[l]eases, service
contracts, loyalty programs, customer marketing, and even end-user
license agreements are forms of an ongoing relationship, even with
users other than the original buyers,”61 the IoT corporation–consumer
relationships are distinctively intimate and ongoing.
IoT-device-enabled surveillance grants companies a newfound
ability to identify violations of once under-enforced or unenforceable
contractual terms. For example, car rental companies regularly restrict
http://www.inetservicescloud.com/the-four-internet-of-things-connectivity-models-explained
[https://perma.cc/ZZY3-C7RG].
57. Hill & Mattu, supra note 22.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Maggie Astor, Your Roomba May Be Mapping Your Home, Collecting Data That Could
Be Shared, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/technology/roombairobot-data-privacy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9TZ8-SN9P]; James Vincent, Google Wants to
Improve Your Smart Home with iRobot’s Room Maps, VERGE (Oct. 31, 2008),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/31/18041876/google-irobot-smart-home-spatial-datamapping-collaboration [https://perma.cc/SVY8-5LEQ].
61. Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1804.
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out-of-state driving.62 Absent an incident, however, this rule was often
ignored by both the company and consumer, as it was generally
unenforceable (if still a useful liability shield for the company in the
case of an out-of-state accident). But GPS trackers now allow
companies to monitor where and how fast a car is driven. One renter,
who anticipated a $259.51 rental bill, had to pay $3405.05 due to a onedollar-per-mile fine for having crossed state lines;63 another was
charged a $450 fine for three instances of speeding.64 More recently, a
woman’s auto loan contract restricted her from driving outside of a
four-county perimeter.65 When she fled to a shelter outside of that zone
to escape her abusive husband, the company sent a tow truck to
retrieve the vehicle.66
IoT companies also market their compliance surveillance to other
industries. For example, a smart intercom company’s New York City
advertising campaign emphasizes that landlords can use their
technology to photograph visitors, allowing them to determine if
tenants are illegally subletting units—which would then allow them to
evict tenants and take steps to circumvent rent-control laws.67
IoT companies’ newfound ability to engage in individualized
surveillance marks a seismic shift in the enforceability of contractual
provisions. Indeed, it invites companies to incorporate increasingly
stringent and invasive terms into their contracts—precisely because

62. See, e.g., Fox Rent A Car – Frequently Asked Questions, FOX RENT A CAR,
https://www.foxrentacar.com/en/faqs.html
[https://perma.cc/B2SU-LGNF]
(providing
information regarding the states within which a vehicle may be driven, depending on where it is
rented).
63. Christopher Elliott, Business Travel: Some Rental Cars Are Keeping Tabs on the Drivers,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/13/business/business-travel-somerental-cars-are-keeping-tabs-on-the-drivers.html [https://perma.cc/TA4S-ZUNE] (“The industry
views telematics as a way to enforce its contracts . . . .”).
64. Catherine Greenman, The Car Snitched. He Sued., N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/28/technology/the-car-snitched-he-sued.html
[https://perma.cc/
8PFC-SPY7].
65. Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2.
66. Id.
67. Alfred Ng, Smart Home Tech Can Help Evict Renters, Surveillance Company Tells
Landlords, CNET (Oct. 25, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/install-smart-home-techevict-renters-surveillance-company-tells-landlords [https://perma.cc/T2BT-9BDR] (reporting
that an email advertised, “Use the GateGuard AI Doorman Intercom to catch illegal sublets, nonprimaries, Airbnbs, so you can vacate a unit,” and “Combine a $950/mo studio and a $1400/mo
one-bedroom into a $4200 DEREGULATED two-bedroom”).
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those terms can now be enforced.68 Lenders can already monitor when
a leased vehicle is at the lessor’s place of employment;69 it is easy to
imagine a lender conditioning the use of the car on employment
attendance.
2. Facilitating (Automated) Corporate Remote Interference.
“Remote interference” is the act of altering how an IoT device works
at a distance, either by pushing through an over-the-air software
update or discontinuing a service. Companies can remotely alter a
device’s software to add new functions, such as when Tesla pushed an
update that helped unfreeze the charge port in cold weather;70 to
remove other functions, as occurred when Nokia required users to
accept a software update that disabled a key feature of its smart
scales;71 or to completely deactivate a device or larger system, as when
a starter-interrupt device “boots” a leased car.72 Terminating a service
may also constitute remote interference.73 Without the ability to
exchange information with a service provider, an IoT smart-home hub
is little more than an unusually expensive paperweight—as users of the
Revolv learned to their dismay when the company announced it would
be shutting down support for the hub and its associated apps.74 For
other IoT devices, the lack of a service will simply render a once-smart
item dumb. In 2016, for example, lighting company TCP stopped
hosting a server that enabled their IoT lightbulbs’ remote
68. See, e.g., Kristelia A. García, Technological Rights Accretion, 36 YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 19, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/technological-rights-accretion-bykristelia-a-garcia [https://perma.cc/Y6CX-35AS] (discussing an app that “purports to use
blockchain technology to enable visual artists to ‘track’ art they sell such that if and when it is
later resold, they are able to enforce a so-called ‘resale royalty,’” a contractual term “that has
been repeatedly considered and explicitly rejected by Congress”).
69. Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2 (noting that a lender “typically shuts down
cars when they are parked at the borrower’s house or workplace”).
70. Fred Lambert, Tesla Releases Software Update To Help Unfreeze Charge Port,
ELECTREK (Dec. 27, 2018), https://electrek.co/2018/12/27/tesla-software-update-unfreezecharge-port [https://perma.cc/
8M8M-GZ6E].
71. Daniel Cooper, Nokia Will Disable the Key Feature of Its Priciest Scale, ENGADGET (Jan.
22, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/01/22/nokia-disables-pulse-wave-velocity-bodycardio [https://perma.cc/85CX-TWPJ].
72. Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2.
73. Elvy, supra note 14, at 100 (“[T]he range of operations of an IOT device is very much
dependent on the services and software provided by companies.”).
74. Alissa Walker, If You Use Revolv’s Smart Hub, You Are Officially Screwed (Thanks
Nest!), GIZMODO (Apr. 4, 2016), https://gizmodo.com/nest-owned-smart-hub-gets-permanentlykilled-1768977505 [https://perma.cc/5TM3-E5EM].
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functionality.75 The bulbs still provide light, but the capabilities that
justified their steeper price tag no longer exist.76 In contrast, for other
devices, certain services are relatively superfluous. For example, the
termination of a radio streaming service has little impact on a car’s
overall utility.
An IoT company’s right to engage in remote interference is often
enshrined in its terms of service.77 Google Nest smart-home products,
for example, require users to consent in advance to automatic “patches,
bug fixes, updates, upgrades and other modifications to improve the
performance of the Product Software and related services.”78 While the
benefits of corporate remote interference are often advertised,79 it also
creates significant and underappreciated negative externalities.
Because IoT devices are digital, automating remote interference
is relatively costless. If anything, it may result in cost savings,
incentivizing companies to automate. But automating remote
interference raises the same concerns that attend any discussion of
algorithmic, “perfect” enforcement,80 including the creation of a

75. Kate Cox, TCP Disconnects “Smart” Lightbulb Servers, Leaves Buyers in the Dark,
CONSUMERIST (Sept. 26, 2016), https://consumerist.com/2016/08/19/tcp-disconnects-smartlightbulb-servers-leaves-buyers-in-the-dark [https://perma.cc/TAQ2-JNL8].
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON (May 17, 2018) [hereinafter Alexa Terms],
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201809740
[https://perma.cc/3HEL-LTH8] (“We may change, suspend, or discontinue Alexa, or any part of
it,
at
any
time
without
notice.”);
Software
Updates,
TESLA,
https://www.tesla.com/support/software-updates [https://perma.cc/VXX9-PWCL] (“[Tesla] cars
regularly receive over-the-air software updates that add new features and enhance existing ones
over Wi-Fi. When updates become available, you’ll receive a notification on your center
touchscreen display, with the option to install the update immediately or schedule for later.”);
Terms of Use for Hue, PHILIPS HUE [hereinafter Philips Hue Terms],
https://www2.meethue.com/en-us/product-terms [https://perma.cc/A24U-U6E3] (“Signify may
update or change software for seamless Services, and may do so remotely without notifying
you.”); Uconnect Terms and Conditions, UCONNECT, ¶ 17 [hereinafter Uconnect Terms],
https://www.driveuconnect.com/terms-and-conditions.html
[https://perma.cc/R9U8-7XMA]
(“At any time we may need or be required to update or change the software on your vehicle, and
may do so remotely without notifying you. You agree that we may perform these software updates
or changes remotely without any further consent required . . . .”).
78. End-User License Agreement, NEST [hereinafter Nest License Agreement],
https://nest.com/nz/legal/eula [https://perma.cc/3M6Z-W48Q].
79. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
80. See generally, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1249 (2008) (discussing the drawbacks of automating administrative decision-making); Meg
Leta Jones & Karen Levy, Sporting Chances: Robot Referees and the Automation of
Enforcement (Nov. 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3293076
[https://perma.cc/VA7B-UBUD] (extrapolating from the resistance to the use of automated
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Kafkaesque bureaucratic enforcement regime.81 Automated decisionmaking is self-executing, and therefore incontrovertible, inarguable,
and self-sustaining.82 It minimizes opportunities for efficient breach,
mutually beneficial negotiation, and compromise.83 For example, when
the transaction costs associated with repossession were high, lenders
often contacted consumers before a repossession to negotiate
immediate partial payment or a longer-term loan with a higher interest
rate. With automated remote interference, however, company
representatives have less incentive to communicate with consumers.
Further, no system is error free, but automation locks in and amplifies
errors.84 One individual has alleged that his car has been “routinely
shut down[,] even when he was current on his $362 monthly car
payment.”85 Instead of being able to demonstrate proof of payment to
a repossession agent, he was reduced to using a screwdriver to rig the
starter in to get home.86 Automating the use of starter-interrupt devices
would multiply these kinds of errors, while simultaneously making
difficult for affected parties to communicate with someone to correct
them.
3. Enabling Corporate Self-Help. Traditionally, a company
attempting to repossess an item after an alleged breach of contract
would have two options: engage in self-help or involve the state.87
However, given the risk of physical violence that accompanied selfofficiating systems in professional sports to identify the benefits of imperfect human decisionmakers).
81. See, e.g., Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care,
VERGE (May 21, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaidalgorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://perma.cc/GX3W-F3MZ].
82. LESSIG, supra note 45, at 342.
83. Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 13, at 1161–62 (observing that
applying digital rights management technologies “to real-world objects, such as cars, weapons, or
computers” eliminates opportunities for efficient breaches and “risks making rights-infringing,
but necessary, decisions impossible”).
84. Cf. ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 114–16 (discussing the risk that algorithmically enabled
perfect enforcement locks in mistakes in the context of copyright and First Amendment law);
Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 13, at 1165 (“[T]he failures of [digital rights
management technologies] are legion, particularly when the technology fails on its own terms and
blocks people from accessing content they have a license to access.”).
85. Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2.
86. Id.
87. As the name implies, “self-help” consists of private actions taken by parties to a
controversy, either to prevent or resolve a dispute, without the involvement of a government actor
or disinterested third party. Celia R. Taylor, Self-Help in Contract Law: An Exploration and
Proposal, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 841 (1998).
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help repossession, it is only lawful if it can be done without breaching
the peace.88 If the holder of the disputed property protests its removal89
or keeps the property in a locked building,90 the would-be reclaimant
is obliged to involve the state, as “[o]nly the state could enter a private
home or office against the owner’s will, and then only within the limits
established by the due process principles.”91 Even in jurisdictions
where a contract explicitly permits creditors to enter private dwellings
for the purposes of repossession, courts regularly read the “breach of
the peace” exception into the contract.92 Similarly, many states prohibit
landlords from engaging in self-help to repossess a disputed property,
while those that permit self-help do so subject to a “breach of the
peace” standard.93
Today, the possibility of remote interference creates a third option
when there is a contractual dispute: instead of attempting to physically
retrieve an item, an IoT company can employ remote interference to
effectively “digitally repossess” some features or an entire item—an
act that, absent the contract, would be considered criminal.94
Of course, self-help corporate remote interference may be
acceptable in some scenarios. For example, a company can raise rates
for a subscription service and stop providing the service should a
customer refuse to pay, even if that renders an IoT device useless.95 The
benefits of self-help in such circumstances outweigh the various costs

88. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1103.
89. Both Connecticut and New York courts have held that conduct resulting in verbal
objections alone can constitute prohibited breaches of the peace. Aviles v. Wayside Auto Body,
Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 216, 226 (D. Conn. 2014) (“[A] repossessor may breach the peace if they
repossess a vehicle in the face of oral protest from the owner of the vehicle.”); Boles v. Cty. of
Montgomery, No. 6:11–cv–522, 2014 WL 582259, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (“It is clear that a mere
verbal objection to the removal of property constitutes a breach of the peace.”).
90. Most states allow repossessors to enter driveways that are open to the public. See, e.g.,
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7508.2(d) (prohibiting entry into “any private building or secured
area”). Massachusetts, however, does not allow any entrance onto private property. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 255B, § 20B (2017).
91. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1103. This common law prohibition on creating a “breach of the
peace” was incorporated into U.C.C. articles 9 and 2A. U.C.C. § 2A-525 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 1990); U.C.C. § 9-503 (2010).
92. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1104 n.51.
93. Id. at 1104 n.49.
94. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018).
95. Should discontinuing a service create a foreseeable risk of harm, there may be a
heightened notice requirement. See infra Part II.C (discussing how certain entities—namely,
utilities and landlords—must provide notice of discontinued service commensurate with the
potential risk of harm).
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of state involvement to both parties and to the state.96 However,
because self-helpers judge the righteousness of their own cause,
“[t]here is ample reason to worry that they will misconstrue the law
along the way—not just, or even primarily, on account of bad faith,”
but rather because they are unconsciously motivated to reach a
particular response.97 Self-interested enforcement is even more
problematic when the relevant law is drafted by the enforcing entity—
as is the case when IoT companies act in accordance with their terms
of service.
IoT companies are already using remote interference or the threat
of remote interference to hold IoT devices hostage and compel
consumer action or extract concessions. One such example is
conditioning product use on agreement to unilateral contractual
modifications.98 Should a user object, their only recourse is to forego
using the device.99 For example, Sonos, a smart-speaker company,
recently announced that it would not provide expected and necessary
software updates unless consumers agreed to changes to the privacy
and data-collection policy, which expand the company’s ability to use
the speakers to collect, use, and share personal data.100 As a company
spokesperson stated: “The customer can choose to acknowledge the
policy, or can accept that over time their product may cease to
96. Cf. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 49 (2014)
(“Self-help would not pose such a knotty problem for legal designers if it did not yield valuable
benefits.”). The possibility of self-help may deter “wrongdoing from occurring in the first place,
reduce administrative costs, promote autonomy- or sovereignty-related values, and facilitate
speedier redress.” Id. At a deeper level, self-help might foster “cooperative relations, mitigate
feelings of alienation from the law, or generate deeper internalization of first-order legal norms.”
Id.
97. Id. at 50 (noting that self-helpers may be biased by “motivated cognition and reliance on
congenial interpretive methods or theories of law”).
98. See generally NANCY KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS (2013) (discussing how wrap contracts
unfairly burden consumers and create a coercive contracting environment). For a humorous take
on the issue, see Nitrozac & Snaggy, The Internet of Ransomware Things, JOY OF TECH,
http://www.geekculture.com/joyoftech/joyarchives/2340.html
[https://perma.cc/RM63D9WY] (illustrating how IoT devices might be held hostage; for example, a coffee maker
threatens, “20 bucks in my PayPal account or I’ll only brew decaf!”).
99. See, e.g., Nest License Agreement, supra note 78 (“You consent to this automatic update.
If you do not want such Updates, your remedy is to stop using the Product.”); Uconnect Terms,
supra note 77, ¶ 25 (“Sprint reserves the right to modify the Uconnect Services (including remote
updates on the Device)” and its terms of service “at any time without notice or liability to you in
its sole discretion. If you do not agree with the modifications, your sole and exclusive remedy is
to not use the Uconnect Services.”).
100. Zack Whittaker, Sonos Says Users Must Accept New Privacy Policy or Devices May
“Cease To Function,” ZERO DAY (Aug. 21, 2017), http://www.zdnet.com/article/sonos-acceptnew-privacy-policy-speakers-cease-to-function [https://perma.cc/N7WC-YTHB].
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function.”101 Alternatively, an IoT company may engage in secretly
coercive remote interference, such as when Apple pushed an
operating-server update including a hardware-management feature
that slowed down processors in phones with aging batteries, apparently
to boost sales of its newer iPhone models.102
The power to enforce includes the power to decide when to
enforce. Networked devices and personalized surveillance enable
strategically manipulative action; the more companies know about
individuals and the more devices they can control, the more
influentially they can time when and how they address contractual
breaches. Your car can be disabled just before work or a flight, or you
might receive a notification that your smart thermostat was turned off
or your front door unlocked while you are on vacation.103
In the absence of state oversight, bad-faith actors are freer to
abuse these new self-help powers. In April 2017, an individual who
purchased Garadget—an internet-connected garage door opener—
reported problems and left an angry comment on the Garadget
community board, followed by a one-star review on Amazon.104 Denis
Grisak, the product’s inventor and distributer, responded by denying
the unit server connection.105 Because the Garadget purchaser had not
activated the device, he was not at risk of being locked out of his garage
or having his garage door left open—but another customer who had
activated the device and then annoyed the company might have
been.106 Absent a shift in governance, it will become increasingly
commonplace for IoT companies to exploit this coercive capability.107

101. Id.
102. Steve Mullis, Lawsuits Mount as Apple Manages Fallout from Revelation of Slowed
iPhones, NPR (Dec. 31, 2017, 8:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/31/574792184/lawsuitsmount-as-apple-manages-fallout-from-revelation-of-slowed-iphones
[https://perma.cc/JZ4RFZJ6].
103. Cf. Ben Dickson, The IoT Ransomware Threat Is More Serious Than You Think, IOT
SEC. FOUND. (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.iotsecurityfoundation.org/the-iot-ransomware-threatis-more-serious-than-you-think [https://perma.cc/6QFU-TJ4L] (arguing that it is the timing of
ransomware attacks, rather than their irreversibility, that will render IoT ransomware effective).
104. Sean Gallagher, IoT Garage Door Opener Maker Bricks Customer’s Product After Bad
Review, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 4, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2017/04/iot-garage-door-opener-maker-bricks-customers-product-after-bad-review
[https://perma.cc/F883-ZR76].
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Tim Cushing, Software Company Shows How Not To Handle Negative Review,
(Dec.
22,
2016,
8:20
AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
TECHDIRT
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We have seen how connected products enable contractually
permitted industry control before.108 Companies have long employed
terms of service and digital rights management technologies to limit
consumer options—say, to keep consumers from sharing music files or
independently repairing a device.109 Famously, Amazon remotely
deleted e-books from users’ Kindle e-readers, including George
Orwell’s “1984,” of all possible texts!110 Unrelenting self-help
enforcement, mediated through technology, is problematic enough in
the digital realm. But in the IoT context, it also increases the risk of
physical injury to consumers.
B. A New Vector for Harm
IoT devices are “embodied”111: they have a presence in and ability
to interact with the physical world.112 And with physicality comes the
20161220/12411836320/software-company-shows-how-not-to-handle-negative-review.shtml
[https://perma.cc/H2RX-62Y7].
108. Cf. K. Sabeel Rahman, Regulating Informational Infrastructure: Internet Platforms as the
New Public Utilities, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 234, 237 (2018) (“Those who control the terms of
access to, and administration of, infrastructure are in a position to dominate those who depend
on that infrastructure.”).
109. Right-to-repair advocates argue that “manufacturers have increasingly used restrictive
warranties, digital locks, and more to make it hard, or in some cases even impossible, for
consumers to fix everything from iPhones to John Deere tractors.” Louise Matsakis, Security
(Apr.
30,
2019),
Experts
Unite
over
the
Right
To
Repair,
WIRED
https://www.wired.com/story/right-to-repair-security-experts-california [https://perma.cc/X7A9GSY6]. For example, American farmers have been reduced to buying black-market Ukrainian
software to be able to repair broken tractors without having to go to John Deere dealerships, as
is required by the John Deere license agreement and enforced by the tractor’s software. Jason
Koebler, Farmers Are Hacking Their Tractors with Ukrainian Firmware, MOTHERBOARD (Mar.
21, 2017, 3:17 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xykkkd/why-american-farmersare-hacking-their-tractors-with-ukrainian-firmware [https://perma.cc/DN9G-8ECP]. For a
defense of right-to-repair laws, see generally Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 563 (2016) (arguing that the “freedom to tinker” ought to be protected
under IP law).
110. Amazon remotely removed these copies in response to a claim that the company
“selling” the e-books did not have the rights to them. Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books
from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/
technology/companies/18amazon.html [https://perma.cc/R8FH-82QV].
111. CALO, supra note 25, at 5 (observing that robotic systems combine “the promiscuity of
data with physical embodiment”).
112. To some, this is their most distinctive feature. DeNardis & Raymond, supra note 15, at
477 (“The ‘Internet of Things’ is a tepid conceptual phrase designed to characterize [a] major
transformation in the evolution of the Internet: its expansion beyond communication between
people, or between people and information content, and into billions of everyday objects.”); see
also Schneier, supra note 15 (“The internet is no longer a web that we connect to. Instead, it’s a
computerized, networked, and interconnected world that we live in. This is the future, and what
we’re calling the Internet of Things.”).

2019]

THE INTERNET OF TORTS

607

possibility of physical harm.113 Consider the relatively innocuous
Roomba, an autonomous vacuum-cleaning robot. In addition to
cleaning untold numbers of floors, one Roomba caused the
Pooptastrophe;114 another “attacked” its sleeping owner;115 and a third
destroyed itself on a hot plate and, due to the resulting smoke damage,
left its owner homeless.116 While there might be disagreement about
where fault lies in each of these scenarios, the overarching point is that
IoT devices’ physicality alters and magnifies the harm potential of
remote interference. The remote deletion of your music file or e-book
might frustrate you; the remote disabling of your security alarm, car, or
implantable medical device could kill you.
The possibilities for potential injuries are limited only by the
item’s damage potential. A disabled smart thermostat could allow a
house to become so hot or cold that plumbing, pets, and potentially
even people could be harmed.117 Pacemakers, insulin pumps, drugadministration devices, and other wearable or implanted medical
devices could affect someone’s physical health,118 while IoT vehicles

113. Jack Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 45, 49 (2015); Calo,
supra note 34, at 534.
(Aug.
9,
2016),
https://www.facebook.com/
114. Jessie
Newton,
FACEBOOK
jesse.newton.37/posts/776177951574 [https://perma.cc/PV4G-G9VJ] (“Do not, under any
circumstances, let your Roomba run over dog poop. . . . Because if that happens, it will spread the
dog poop over every conceivable surface within its reach, resulting in a home that closely
resembles a Jackson Pollock poop painting.”).
115. Justin McCurry, South Korean Woman’s Hair ‘Eaten’ By Robot Vacuum Cleaner as She
Slept, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2015, 11:53 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/feb/09/south-korean-womans-hair-eaten-by-robot-vacuum-cleaner-as-she-slept
[https://perma.cc/Y6HR-2FNS] (detailing the event and noting that the vacuum may not have
been appropriately programmed for cultures where it is common to sit or nap on the floor).
116. Macrina Cooper-White, Robot Suicide? Rogue Roomba Switches Self On, Climbs onto
POST
(Nov.
13,
2013,
1:26
PM),
Hotplate,
Burns
Up,
HUFFINGTON
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/13/robot-suicide-roomba-hotplate-burnsup_n_4268064.html [https://perma.cc/69MY-F9EB].
117. See Mick Bilton, Nest Thermostat Glitch Leaves Users in the Cold, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/fashion/nest-thermostat-glitch-battery-diessoftware-freeze.html [https://perma.cc/G487-CSSQ] (“For those who are elderly or ill, or who
have babies, a freezing house can have dire health consequences. . . . [P]ipes could freeze and
burst, causing major damage.”).
118. See, e.g., Basit Mahmood, Lover Tried To Poison Diabetic Fiancé Using ‘Remote
Controlled Insulin Pump,’ METRO (Mar. 17, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://metro.co.uk/2019/03/17/lovertried-poison-diabetic-fiance-using-remote-controlled-insulin-pump-8916952
[https://perma.cc/B9EV-X5Q] (describing a case of intentional insulin overdose via a remote
controlled pump).
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could injure or kill drivers,119 passengers,120 other drivers,121 and
pedestrians.122
This Article brackets cybersecurity-related harms to focus on
harms resulting from corporate remote interference. To fully
conceptualize the scope of potential harms posed by connected devices
that affect our bodies and environment, however, it is worth discussing
the potential physical threats posed by hacked devices.123 In the mad
rush to be first to market, companies unaccustomed to considering
cybersecurity issues are slapping sensors and transmitters on
everything from Barbie dolls to Buddhist prayer beads,124 resulting in
the neologism that “[t]he ‘S’ in ‘IoT’ stands for ‘security.’”125 Even
reputable and experienced tech companies are producing insecure
products. One team of researchers was able to remotely take control

119. See, e.g., Nathan Bomey, Tesla Model X Driver Killed in California Crash Wasn’t Holding
(June
7,
2018,
1:04
PM),
Steering
Wheel,
NTSB
Says,
USA TODAY
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2018/06/07/tesla-model-x-autopilot-crashntsb-report/681148002 [https://perma.cc/XB6B-YE69] (describing the fatal crash of a partially
autonomous vehicle).
120. See, e.g., Jake Lingeman, Tesla Sued After Speed Limiter Removed, Passenger Killed in
Fatal Crash, AUTOWEEK NEWS (Jan. 11, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://autoweek.com/article/
luxury/tesla-sued-after-speed-limiter-removed-passenger-dead-fatalcrash [https://perma.cc/J96S-EZZF] (describing a lawsuit over a passenger’s death in a crash
involving a partially autonomous vehicle).
121. See, e.g., Tim Stelloh, Tesla Was in Autopilot Mode Before Utah Crash, Driver Tells
Police, NBC NEWS (May 14, 2018, 6:06 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/tesla-wasautopilot-mode-utah-crash-driver-tells-police-n874136 [https://perma.cc/72GH-PSMF]
(describing how a partially autonomous vehicle ran a red light and struck a truck).
122. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona,
Where Robots Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/19/technology/uber-driverless-fatality.html [https://perma.cc/8QQJ-74NZ] (describing
the death of a pedestrian after being struck by a partially autonomous vehicle).
123. See supra note 15.
124. Samuel Gibbs, Hackers Can Hijack Wi-Fi Hello Barbie To Spy on Your Children,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2015, 6:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/nov/26/
hackers-can-hijack-wi-fi-hello-barbie-to-spy-on-your-children [https://perma.cc/NT5J-5769]; Ko
Tin-yau, Buddhists Go High-Tech: Acer To Launch Smart Prayer Beads, EJINSIGHT (Jan. 30,
2018, 5:06 PM), http://www.ejinsight.com/20180130-buddhists-go-high-tech-acer-tolaunch-smart-prayer-beads [https://perma.cc/KYU2-CEU3]; see JAN-PETER KLEINHANS,
STIFTUNG NEUE VERANTWORTUNG, INTERNET OF INSECURE THINGS: CAN SECURITY
ASSESSMENT CURE MARKET FAILURES? 5 (2017) (“The current trend is to make everything
‘smart’ – toaster, fridge, thermostat, lighting.”).
125. Cf. KLEINHANS, supra note 124, at 9–14 (describing how IoT devices are vulnerable to
exploitation by hackers and criminals and suggesting ways to improve the security of IoT devices).
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of a Jeep SUV while it was being driven;126 another team identified
flaws in Apple’s HomeKit smart-home system that would have
permitted hackers to unlock front doors.127 The insecurity of the
“Internet of Things Inside Our Body”128 risks deadly hacks, as
highlighted by Vice President Dick Cheney’s decision to disable his
heart implant’s wireless connectivity while he was in office129 and the
FDA-mandated recall of more than four hundred thousand
pacemakers due to a cybersecurity vulnerability.130 Other hackers have
demonstrated that it is possible to take control of smart lights and use
them to induce epileptic seizures.131 Further, the more electrical grids,
transportation services, health and medical systems, and other critical
infrastructure are incorporated into the IoT ecosystem, the more likely
it is that disruption of those systems will threaten human safety and
national security.132 In June 2017, for example, the NotPetya malware
attack rendered data on compromised systems completely inaccessible,
forcing banks to close, hospitals to cancel operations, and the radiation

126. Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It, WIRED
(July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway
[https://perma.cc/6YCN-AMZT].
127. Samuel Gibbs, Apple Fixes HomeKit Bug That Allowed Remote Unlocking of Users’
Doors, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2017, 5:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2017/dec/08/apple-fixes-homekit-bug-remote-unlocking-doors-security-flaw-iphoneipad-ios-112-smart-lock-home [https://perma.cc/546E-GYMG].
128. See Kerr, supra note 20, at 341–43 (listing the multiple medical uses and capabilities of
radio-frequency implantable devices and warning of the corresponding need for stronger privacy
regulations).
129. Dana Ford, Cheney’s Defibrillator Was Modified To Prevent Hacking, CNN (Oct, 24,
2013, 9:51 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/20/us/dick-cheney-gupta-interview/index.html
[https://perma.cc/UBF7-GUQC].
130. Swati Khandelwal, FDA Recalls Nearly Half a Million Pacemakers over Hacking Fears,
HACKER NEWS (Sept. 1, 2017), https://thehackernews.com/2017/08/pacemakers-hacking.html
[https://perma.cc/A9KC-FVJQ].
131. Eyal Ronen & Adi Shamir, Extended Functionality Attacks on IoT Devices: The Case of
Smart Lights 3–5 (2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, Invited Paper,
2016).
132. See DeNardis & Raymond, supra note 15, at 486–87 (discussing the importance of power
grids and transportation infrastructure to military effectiveness and Russia’s targeting of these
systems in Ukraine as a hybrid-warfare approach). The risks associated with an over-connected
military have often been explored in science fiction. See generally, e.g., P.W. SINGER & AUGUST
COLE, GHOST FLEET: A NOVEL OF THE NEXT WORLD WAR (2016); BATTLESTAR GALACTICA
(1978).
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monitoring system at Ukraine’s Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant to go
offline.133
While hackable cars,134 home-security systems,135 pacemakers,136
and other IoT devices certainly create problems worth addressing,137
the current focus on the physical risks of criminal hacks distracts from
the physical risks of corporate remote interference. As detailed in the
next Part, corporations can do anything hackers can do—but their
actions are legitimized by contract.
II. BARRIERS TO CIVIL LIABILITY SUITS
Classically, contracts allow parties to negotiate their respective
obligations, and informed party consent justifies superseding default
rules. Meanwhile, tort liability for rights that cannot be contracted
away acts as a backstop to protect potentially vulnerable parties.
In the IoT context, however, notwithstanding the escalating
possibility of physical harm resulting from corporate remote
interference,138 contract and tort law operate in tandem to create a

133. Nicole Perlroth, Mark Scott & Sheera Frenkel, Cyberattack Hits Ukraine Then Spreads
Internationally, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/
technology/ransomware-hackers.html?mcubz=0&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5ECP-CLRF].
134. Greenberg, supra note 126.
135. See Edenborough v. ADT, LLC, No. 16-CV-02233-JST, 2016 WL 6160174, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 24, 2016) (discussing a class action suit alleging that a home security system used
unsecured and unencrypted protocols, rendering it vulnerable to hacking).
136. Khandelwal, supra note 130.
137. As IoT devices proliferate, so do stories of hacked IoT devices causing harm, ranging
from hackers terrorizing children through baby monitors, to wide-scale privacy violations, to
worldwide botnet attacks that have taken down large swaths of the internet. For examples of these
incidents in their stated order, see Richard Adhikari, Webcam Maker Takes FTC’s Heat for
(Sept.
5,
2013),
Internet-of-Things
Security
Failure,
TECHNEWSWORLD
https://www.technewsworld.com/story/78891.html [https://perma.cc/Y5U4-8GNB] (reporting
how hackers posted live feeds from nearly seven hundred household cameras); Man Hacks
(Apr.
28,
2014),
Monitor,
Screams
at
Baby
Girl,
NBC
NEWS
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/man-hacks-monitor-screams-baby-girl-n91546
[https://perma.cc/U8WL-VP6T]; and Lily Hay Newman, What We Know About Friday’s Massive
East Coast Internet Outage, WIRED, (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/internetoutage-ddos-dns-dyn [https://perma.cc/YYS8-K9WA] (describing how Mirai-based “botnets”
compromised IoT devices to launch the largest distributed denial-of-service (“DDoS”) attack to
date, taking “down a big chunk of the Internet for most of the Eastern seaboard”).
138. Again, this Article brackets purely economic harms, privacy harms, and cybersecurity
harms to focus on physical harms resulting from corporate remote interference.

2019]

THE INTERNET OF TORTS

611

series of hurdles for would-be plaintiffs. This Part details how our
current civil liability system inappropriately shields IoT companies.139
This is not to say that civil liability mechanisms are incapable of
evolving to address these situations. Common law principles are
relatively tech neutral, allowing them to adjust to different
circumstances. For example, the general duty of care—that an actor
“has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct
creates a risk of physical harm”140—applies equally to someone riding
a bike, driving a car, or operating a tractor. However, absent a better
understanding of how IoT-enabled harms operate and propagate,
judges are likely to apply contracts, products liability, and negligence
doctrinal standards narrowly, in ways that functionally minimize
corporate liability. Further, because these devices allow for corporate
action at a distance, technology’s ability to redirect responsibility and
disrupt the causal chain is heightened in the IoT context.
A. Contractual Obstacles
Most IoT terms of service notify users of the possibility of
corporate remote interference and condition the purchase and use of a
device on consumer acknowledgment and agreement to those terms.141
Standing alone, contractual notice renders this form of electronic selfhelp lawful,142 even in states that otherwise prohibit it.143 When paired

139. Cf. Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 26, at 143–44 (discussing how private firms
use contracts of adhesion, such as shrink-wrap contracts and click-wrap contracts, to sidestep
consumer protection laws and tort law accountability mechanisms in the intellectual property
context).
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 7(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
141. See Whittaker, supra note 100 (identifying one smart speaker company that refused to
provide necessary software updates to users who did not accept modifications to privacy terms).
142. See, e.g., In re VTech Data Breach Litig., No. 15-CV-10889, 15-CV-10891, 15-CV-11620,
15-CV-11885, 2018 WL 1863953, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2018) (dismissing a breach of contract
claim for discontinued services, as the company’s Privacy Policy allowed defendants to terminate
online services at any point).
143. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”) restricts “electronic
self-help,” the repossession of software. Only Virginia and Maryland have adopted the UCITA,
but both states permit contracting parties to consent to such actions. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW
§ 22-816 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-508.16 (2017); see also Brian D. McDonald, The
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 16 BERK. TECH. L.J. 461, 474 (2001)
(describing the nearly full and qualified adoptions of the UCITA by Virginia and Maryland,
respectively). Connecticut also restricts electronic self-help, with an expansive definition that
includes using electronic means to locate collateral, but it also permits contracting parties to agree
that it can be employed. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-609 (2016) (stating that repossession is only
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with exculpatory clauses, notice can restrict or even eliminate
corporate liability; when paired with disclaimers or express warranties,
it can bar breach of warranty claims; standing alone, it can preclude
common law tort suits.144
1. Exculpatory and Other Liability-Limiting Clauses.
Unsurprisingly, IoT-device terms of service agreements attempt to
minimize industry liability for the harms resulting from their remote
interference145 through liability disclaimers or caps on the costs of
breaches.146 Specific- and exclusive-remedy clauses allow companies to
predetermine customer rights.147 For example, Nest’s terms of service
note that, should someone not want the company’s over-the-air
updates, “[their] remedy is to stop using [the Services and] the
Product[s].”148 Meanwhile, monetary ceilings on direct damages149 and

allowed “if the debtor separately agrees to a term of the security agreement authorizing electronic
self-help that requires notice of exercise”).
144. Granted, these statements are generalizations, as every state has different standards for
evaluating these varied claims.
145. As others have detailed, the “law of the firm” often favors the company at the expense
of the consumer. Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 26, at 147–48; see Melissa T.
Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to
Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 4 (2012) (observing that “[s]tandard forms are
ubiquitous, but hardly innocuous” and describing common terms and waivers that privilege
industry).
146. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-316(4), 2-718, 2-719 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951)
(allowing contract modifications that limit damages and remedies).
147. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) (allowing parties to agree to an exclusive remedy). See, e.g.,
TESLA, MODEL S MODEL X MODEL 3 NEW VEHICLE LIMITED WARRANTY (2017–2018)
[hereinafter
Tesla
Warranty],
https://www.tesla.com/sites/default/files/downloads/Model_S_X_Warranty_NA_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A77E-YEYJ] (“The performance of necessary repairs and parts replacement by
Tesla is the exclusive remedy under this New Vehicle Limited Warranty or any implied
warranties.”); see also Philips Hue Terms, supra note 77 (“If you do not want such updates, your
sole remedy is to cease using the Services altogether.”).
148. Nest License Agreement, supra note 78.
149. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-719 (allowing limitation of damages). For example, Tesla’s warranty states
that it “shall not be liable for any direct damages in an amount that exceeds the fair market value
of the vehicle at the time of the claim.” Tesla Warranty, supra note 147, at 8. Alexa’s terms of use
state that “in no event will our licensors’ or our service providers’ aggregate liability with respect
to any claim arising from or relating to this Agreement or your use of Alexa exceed fifty dollars
($50).” Alexa Terms, supra note 77. Nest limits liability to no more than two times the amount
paid by the consumer, Nest License Agreement, supra note 78; and Philips Hue limits liability to
the amount of fees paid in connection to the service, Philips Hue Terms, supra note 77.
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exclusions of special, incidental, or consequential damages150 also limit
corporate liability.151
These terms purportedly reflect the informed agreement of the
contracting parties; in reality, most of these “agreements” are contracts
of adhesion where unsophisticated consumers have limited
information about the risks of remote interference and no opportunity
to bargain, effectively allowing companies to unilaterally price harms.
Given that many IoT devices are used by individuals who are not in
privity of contract with the IoT company, IoT companies are
reasonably trying to “find ways to ‘bake’ or incorporate ‘the equivalent
of a click-wrap’ agreement into the functionality of their device,” to
limit corporate liability with regard to all device users.152 Ultimately,
these contracts “launder injustice”153 insofar as they legitimize
otherwise unfair allocations of liability.
Granted, the ability to contractually limit liability is not
unbounded.154 While we are far from the days when courts would strike
down any contractual limitation on liability for negligence,155 most
states circumscribe a limit’s application. Exculpatory clauses that limit

150. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-715 (describing and defining incidental and consequential damages). For
example, “Tesla . . . disclaims any and all indirect, incidental, special and consequential damages
arising out of or relating to your vehicle.” Tesla Warranty, supra note 147, at 7. Similarly, Nest
excludes any “consequential, exemplary, special or incidental damages.” Nest License Agreement,
supra note 78.
151. Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 26, at 149 (discussing how exculpatory clauses
purport to relieve firms of liability from negligence damages and litigation remedies generally).
152. E.g., Mauricio Paez & Mike La Marca, The Internet of Things: Emerging Legal Issues for
Businesses, 43 NORTHERN KY. L. REV. 29, 61 (2016); e.g. id. (“If the product lacks a user interface
where the end-user can check a box or otherwise agree to terms, the product should require the
user’s agreement through a website or mobile application prior to enabling functionality.”).
153. Daniel Markovits, Good Faith as Contract’s Core Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 272, 291 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds.,
2014) (“[C]ontract possesses the power to launder injustice, creating legitimate entitlements
between parties where previously there were none and, moreover, inducing the parties to
recognize these entitlements.”).
154. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(providing the contexts under which terms exempting parties from liability are unenforceable on
grounds of public policy, including: (1) when the harm is caused intentionally or recklessly; (2)
when the harm is caused negligently by (a) an employer to his employee, (b) by one owing a duty
of public service, or (c) when the harm is done to someone of a protected class; and (3) when
physical harm to a consumer would result from use of a product, unless that term is fairly
bargained for and consistent with the policy underlying that liability).
155. See The Steamer Syracuse, 79 U.S. 167, 171 (1870) (“It is unnecessary to consider the
evidence relating to the alleged contract of towage, because, [even] if . . . the canal-boat was being
towed at her own risk, nevertheless, the steamer is liable, if, through the negligence of those in
charge of her, the canal-boat has suffered loss.”).
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future liability for physical injury are invalid in three states.156 Other
states invalidate exculpatory clauses that are overly broad,157 are
presented in complex or unclear language,158 attempt to waive liability
for intentional acts159 or gross negligence,160 or are otherwise
unconscionable161 or contrary to public policy.162 Further, under the
U.C.C., clauses limiting liability for bodily harms caused by consumer

156. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-702 (2017); Hiett v.
Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass’n, 418 S.E.2d 894, 897 (Va. 1992).
157. See, e.g., Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 691 N.W.2d 334, 343 (Wis. 2005)
(considering multiple factors and ultimately holding that the exculpatory waiver in a swimming
facility agreement was too broad and did not provide notice or an opportunity to bargain).
158. See Swartzentruber v. Wee-K Corp., 690 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)
(“[E]xculpatory provisions in contracts are to be strictly construed so as not to relieve one from
liability for his own negligence unless it is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms.” (quotations
omitted) (quoting Glaspell v. Ohio Edison Co., 505 N.E.2d 264, 265–67 (Ohio 1987))).
159. See, e.g., Moore v. Waller, 930 A.2d 176, 179 (D.C. 2007) (“[C]ourts have not generally
enforced exculpatory clauses to the extent that they limited a party’s liability for gross negligence,
recklessness or intentional torts.” (quoting Carleton v. Winter, 901 A.2d 174, 181 (D.C. 2006)));
Mankap Enters., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 427 So.2d 332, 333–34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (“The law is settled that a party cannot contract against liability for his own fraud in order
to exempt him from liability for an intentional tort, and any such exculpatory clauses are void as
against public policy.” (citations omitted)).
160. See, e.g., Smallwood v. NCSOFT Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1227 (D. Haw. 2010)
(describing this as “the majority rule”); Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465, 468 (Cal.
1963) (delineating the Tunkl factors for when an exculpatory clause is invalid as contrary to public
policy). This norm is sometimes enacted in state statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West
2013) (“All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from
responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation
of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”).
161. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(defining the scope of unconscionability and holding that, where the element of unconscionability
is present at the time a contract is made, the contract may be unenforceable); Day v. CTA, Inc.,
324 P.3d 1205, 1209 (Mont. 2014) (“A contract is unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion and
if the contractual terms unreasonably favor the drafter.”).
162. See, e.g., Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 377, 384–85 (N.Y. 1983)
(“[A]n exculpatory agreement, no matter how flat and unqualified its terms, will not exonerate a
party from liability under all circumstances. Under announced public policy, it will not apply to
exemption of willful or grossly negligent acts.”); Dimick v. Hopkinson, 422 P.3d 512, 517 (Wyo.
2018) (“Wyoming courts enforce exculpatory clauses releasing parties from liability for injury or
damages resulting from negligence if the clause is not contrary to public policy.” (quoting
Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wyo. 1986))). California courts consider six factors to
identify when an exculpatory clause should be held invalid as contrary to public policy. Tunkl v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92 (Cal. 1963).
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goods are prima facie unconscionable,163 and—when litigated—courts
rarely uphold such clauses.164
Given the variability of these rules and many consumers’ lack of
access to justice, however, companies often purport to waive all claims
to the extent legally possible—and then some.165 For instance, Tesla’s
warranty states that its “limitations and exclusions shall apply whether
your claim is in contract, tort (including negligence and gross
negligence), breach of warranty or condition, misrepresentation
(whether negligent or otherwise) or otherwise at law or in equity.”166
Some IoT contracts attempt to waive liability even for “reasonably
foreseeable” harm;167 others induce reliance on a risk-avoidance
service and then claim to waive liability when corporate remote
interference results in a failure to provide that service.168 Although an
exculpatory clause’s scope will be limited in situations where a
company’s remote interference constitutes an intentional act or gross
negligence, in the forty-seven states that do not proactively invalidate
exculpatory clauses, carefully crafted contractual terms can minimize
corporate liability for injuries resulting from ordinary negligence.169
For example, although retaliatory bricking of a garage door based on a
bad Amazon review would likely be considered an intentional act that

163. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951). This is a rebuttable
presumption. See Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 852–53 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the exculpatory provision at issue was not unconscionable because of the buyer’s familiarity
with the document and awareness of the terms, and thus the clause was valid and enforceable);
Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 402 (4th Cir. 1973) (noting that, in this case, the
defendant failed to rebut the presumption of unconscionability).
164. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 286 n.12 (Alaska 1976) (noting that
courts “rarely uphold” waivers of liability for personal injuries).
165. Memo from Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C. on Exculpatory Agreements and
Liability Waivers in All 50 States (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.mwl-law.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/EXCULPATORY-AGREEMENTS-AND-LIABILITY-WAIVERSCHART-00214377x9EBBF.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8S5-PLEY].
166. Tesla Warranty, supra note 147, at 7–8.
167. See, e.g., id. (stating that its warranty limitations and exclusions apply “even if Tesla is
advised of the possibility of such damages or such damages are reasonably foreseeable”).
168. Uconnect—a company that makes and services software for Fiat Chrysler—notes in its
terms of service that it has the right to make software updates without notice and that, during
updates, “you may be unable to use the Uconnect Services or place a call to 9-1-1 until the
software update is complete.” Uconnect Terms, supra note 77, ¶¶ 9.3, 17; see also id. ¶ 25 (“Sprint
reserves the right to modify the Uconnect Services (including remote updates on the Device) . . .
at any time without notice or liability to you in its sole discretion. . . . Sprint may deactivate the
Uconnect Services at any time without notice or liability to you.”).
169. Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, supra note 165, at 6–7 (detailing standards for different
states).
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invalidates the contractual exculpatory clause, the automated bricking
of that same door after nonpayment may retain the clause’s
protection.170
Nor will modern courts likely find exculpatory clauses void as
unconscionable in cases involving IoT devices marketed for individual
or household use. As has been frequently bemoaned, “the doctrine [of
unconscionability] offers little hope in the consumer goods realm.”171
While the U.C.C. creates a strong presumption of unconscionability for
IoT devices that cause bodily harm,172 it does not create a similar one
for property damage;173 nor will it easily be applied when IoT devices
cause bodily harm indirectly.174 Further, courts are generally unwilling
to find commercial contracts procedurally unconscionable,175
particularly—as will be the case for most IoT items—where the
consumer has options regarding which product to buy176 or where the
contract circumscribes corporate liability for a recreational or frivolous
activity.177 And even though IoT-device terms of service are often
“take-it-or-leave-it” contracts, this is insufficient to establish

170. Gallagher, supra note 104.
171. Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 1311, 1364 (2015); see also Lonegrass, supra note 145, at 3 (observing that the
unconscionability doctrine “has been an ineffectual tool for consumer protection”).
172. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951).
173. Id.; see, e.g., Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 83 N.J. 320, 331–
32 (1979) (distinguishing between personal injury loss and property loss).
174. See infra Part II.D.
175. In addition to the libertarian argument in favor of parties being able to bind themselves
“as they see fit,” Hall v. Sinclair Refining Co., 242 N.C. 707, 709 (1955), courts justify upholding
exculpatory clauses in the business context on the ground that it promotes efficiency. As noted
by one court, “[Exculpatory] clauses enable businesses to engage in commerce without incurring
excessive financial risks that might otherwise make doing business prohibitively expensive.”
Locke v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 669, 676 (N.D. Ill. 2014); see also Gladden v.
Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 144–45 (“Limitation of liability and exculpation clauses are . . .
commercially reasonable in at least some cases, since they permit the provider to offer the service
at a lower price, in turn making the service available to people who otherwise would be unable to
afford it.”); Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally
Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 438 (2008) (“[C]ourts are reluctant to apply the doctrine of
unconscionability in the commercial context.”).
176. Scott J. Burnham, Are You Free to Contract Away Your Right to Bring a Negligence
Claim?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379, 383 (2014). However, the existence of a market for IoT
devices should not be a relevant factor in an unconscionability analysis—as discussed below, the
market is unlikely to provide the information consumers would need to make an informed
selection among products. See infra Part II.E.
177. Burnham, supra note 176, at 383.
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procedural unconscionability.178 Meanwhile, for a provision to be
found substantively unconscionable, the terms must be “shocking to
the conscience,” “monstrously harsh,” or “exceedingly calloused”179—
and exculpatory clauses rarely meet this high bar.180 In addition to these
familiar limits, remote interference introduces an additional snarl:
because the unconscionability doctrine applies to the sale of goods,
courts may not apply it to sales of IoT devices that bundle a good with
one or more services, especially where the injury results from the
cessation of a service.181
While courts will sometimes void contractual provisions as
contrary to public policy, they are often unwilling to do so on the
grounds that efficiency and economic growth require predictability and
stability in contract and property regimes.182 For a public policy
argument to succeed in the IoT context, the court must confront the
larger question of whether these market values outweigh the aims
achieved by requiring companies to shoulder liability for the physical
harms caused by their remote interference.183 But this determination
requires a thorough understanding of how corporate remote

178. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 96–97 (N.J.
2006) (“The determination that a contract is one of adhesion, however, is the beginning, not the
end, of the inquiry into whether a contract . . . should be deemed unenforceable . . . . A sharpened
inquiry concerning unconscionability is necessary when a contract of adhesion is involved.”
(citations omitted)), superseded in part by statute in Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.
2011); see also Burnham, supra note 176, at 381 (“Most of the time, the exculpatory clause is going
to be found in a contract of adhesion. But as the courts say ad nauseam, that is not enough to
establish unconscionability, even procedural unconscionability.”); Joshua N. Cohen, Sound the
Alarm: Limitations of Liability in Alarm Service Contracts, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 813, 818 (2016)
(“Often, exculpatory clauses are found in standard-form contracts that are offered on a ‘take it
or leave it’ basis, known as contracts of adhesion. However, the mere fact that an exculpatory
clause appears in an adhesion contract is not enough to establish procedural unconscionability.”
(citations omitted)).
179. See, e.g., Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197 (Wash. 2013).
180. See, e.g., Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc., 157 So.3d 256, 260 (Fla. 2015) (explaining
that while “[p]ublic policy disfavors exculpatory contracts because they relieve one party of the
obligation to use due care and shift the risk of injury to the party who is probably least equipped
to take the necessary precautions to avoid injury and bear the risk of loss,” the preference of
courts is to respect the freedom to contract and honor contractual terms whenever possible;
accordingly, “unambiguous exculpatory contracts are enforceable unless they contravene public
policy” (citations omitted)); Lonegrass, supra note 145, at 4 (noting that this aspect of the doctrine
“discourages decision makers from inquiring whether boilerplate [contract] terms produce
unacceptably harsh results”).
181. Elvy, supra note 14, at 118.
182. Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, supra note 165, at 2.
183. This Article proposes various public policy arguments for limiting the scope of corporate
exculpatory clauses below. See infra Part III.B.1.b.
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interference enables and increases consumer harm, both at the
individual and aggregate levels.184
2. Warranty Claims. When purchased items do not operate as
expected, consumers can bring breach of warranty claims grounded in
express or implied warranties. Assuming an IoT company does not
explicitly state that it will not remotely alter or deactivate the IoT
device—indeed, most terms of service have statements to the opposite,
expressly reserving the right to engage in such activities185—a
consumer’s only possible warranty claim for harms arising from remote
interference would be a violation of an implied warranty of
merchantability.186 This generally means that the goods are “fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,” are of a fair quality,
and “conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label.”187 But breach of warranty claims for consumer
harms resulting from remote interference will likely fail, either because
the IoT device will be deemed incidental to the provision of a service,
such that U.C.C. implied warranties will not attach,188 or because they
are barred by contractual provisions.189
Courts rarely find that devices that exist primarily to provide a
service have an implied warranty of merchantability. Where a product
bundles a good with a service, as is often the case for IoT devices, courts
employ the predominance test to evaluate whether an implied
warranty attaches; if the product’s primary purpose “is the rendition of
service, with goods incidentally involved,” courts will generally find
that there is no implied warranty of merchantability.190 An Amazon

184. For a discussion of how intervening actors introduce seeming breaks in the causal chain,
see infra Part II.D.
185. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
186. There is also an implied warranty of fitness, which applies when a seller is assisting a
buyer with a purchase. U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951). Absent
significant revision, however, this warranty will not apply to postsale situations where remote
interference results in harm, as it only governs the seller’s actions at time of sale.
187. U.C.C. § 2-314.
188. Elvy, supra note 14, at 114–17. While courts have found two common law implied
warranties in service contracts—namely, an implied warranty of good workmanship and of
habitability—these warranties will generally not be relevant for most IoT devices purchased for
individual or household use.
189. Id. at 119.
190. See, e.g., Ogden Martin Sys. Indianapolis v. Whiting Corp., 179 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir.
1999); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942,
983 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing implied warranty claims regarding Sony’s Playstation consoles
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Echo, which “connects to Alexa to play music, make calls, set music
alarms and timers, ask questions, [and] control smart home devices”
might fail this test.191
IoT devices that are primarily goods, like a “smart” scale, will have
an implied warranty of merchantability. But savvy companies can
include various provisions in their terms of service contracts to
preclude breach of warranty claims for harms resulting from remote
interference. This implied warranty only represents a promise about
the condition of the product at the time it is sold; it does not guarantee
that a product will last or operate consistently for any specific length of
time, and sellers can contractually modify the warranty’s time period.192
Furthermore, implied warranties do not address problems arising from
failure to follow directions or improper maintenance; an IoT company
could certainly argue that contractually prohibited tinkering or failure
to install an update would constitute a failure to follow directions or
engage in proper maintenance, voiding any express or implied
warranty.193 Finally, IoT companies can include disclaimers and express
warranties that circumscribe implied consumer rights. Courts tend to
uphold implied warranty disclaimers194 and find that express warranties
displace implied ones.195
3. Trespass to Chattels and Conversion. Common law courts have
developed various torts to protect an individual’s right to be free from
others’ interference with lawfully possessed property. Here again,
however, the combination of contractual provisions and the tethered
on the grounds that network services predominated and that “network services are not subject to
the UCC” because they do not satisfy the definition of “goods”).
191. Echo (2nd Generation) – Smart Speakers with Alexa and Dolby Processing, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/all-new-amazon-echo-speaker-with-wifi-alexa-darkcharcoal/dp/B06X
CM9LJ4 [https://perma.cc/9NFN-M8HS].
192. Some states provide that implied warranties are in effect for a specific period of time
after the sale of the item, but these provisions usually allow sellers to modify that length of time
with superseding explicit warranties valid for shorter periods. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §
1791.1(c) (2018).
193. See, e.g., Tesla Warranty, supra note 147, at 7 (stating that warranties will be voided if the
owner “do[es] not follow the specific instructions and recommendations,” including “[i]nstalling
the vehicle’s software updates after notification that there is an update available”).
194. Arlie R. Nogay, Enforcing the Rights of Remote Sellers Under the UCC: Warranty
Disclaimers, the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose and the Notice Requirement
in the Nonprivity Context, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 873, 898 (1986); Scott, supra note 175, at 438.
195. U.C.C. § 2-317(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951) (“Express warranties
displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.”).
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nature of IoT devices shield IoT companies from claims for harms
arising from their remote interference.
If a consumer owns a device, the personal property torts of
conversion and trespass to chattels would seem to address remote
interference.196 Conversion is the “intentional exercise of dominion or
control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of
another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the
other the full value of the chattel.”197 Acts that fall short of conversion
might qualify as trespass to chattels, the act of “intentionally (a)
dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with
a chattel in the possession of another.”198 Liability attaches if the
trespasser “dispossesses the other of the chattel,” “the chattel is
impaired as to its condition, quality, or value,” “the possessor is
deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time,” or “bodily
harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or
thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.”199
Notwithstanding the Restatement’s requirement that there must be
“physical contact” with the property,200 a number of courts have
adopted trespass to chattels as a cause of action against digital
activities, such as email spam and information-gathering software—
also known as “crawlers” or “spiders.”201
But contractual notice of remote interference will preclude these
common law tort claims. Both trespass to chattels and conversion
require proof that the defendant acted without the owner’s consent.202

196. However, these items are increasingly licensed, rather than owned, by consumers, which
creates an additional barrier to ownership-based tort claims. See, e.g., FAIRFIELD, supra note 21;
PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 21; Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 13.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
198. Id. § 217.
199. Id. § 218.
200. Id. § 217 cmt. (e).
201. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(granting injunctive relief on the ground that spiders likely engaged in trespass to chattels);
CompuServ, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1027 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (stating that
the inundation of spam email was actionable trespass to chattels); see also Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,
71 P.3d 296, 306–08 (Cal. 2003) (limiting recovery in similar cases to situations where the plaintiff
could demonstrate either actual interference with the physical functionality of the computer
system or the likelihood that such interference would occur).
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 256; W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT
E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (5th ed.
1984). Modifying these common law torts to address remote interference would require more
than extending an imperfect analogy; rather, it would require altering the consent standard, a
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If the terms of service provide notice of the possibility of remote
interference, defendants will argue that the consumer explicitly
consented to such actions—and these arguments have proven largely
successful in other contexts.203
Further, both torts also require a showing that the plaintiff owns
or has the right to possess the personal property at issue.204 However,
at least in cases of remote interference permitted by contract, and
particularly when employed as a response to a contractual breach, it is
unclear whether the plaintiff has an exclusive right to the disputed
property.
Other intentional common law torts also fail. Trespass to the
person claims—such as battery and false imprisonment—require that
the defendant intended an action, be it contact or confinement. But it
is unlikely that corporate actors would act with the requisite intent.
Even where a physical harm is a foreseeable result of corporate
interference, IoT companies are unlikely to act with sufficient purpose
or have substantial knowledge that a specific contact would ensue to
support a battery claim, especially as statistical knowledge is
insufficient to demonstrate intent.205 Similarly, IoT companies are
unlikely to act with the intent to confine someone, as required for a
false imprisonment claim.206 Meanwhile, although issues of trespass to
land—the tort of wrongfully interfering with another’s real property
rights—often arise in the context of physical repossession, companies

fundamental element of these claims. For example, all cases applying trespass to chattel reasoning
to digital activities emphasize the importance of the plaintiff’s lack of consent.
203. See, e.g., Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1053–54, 1062–63 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(“Courts in this district have interpreted ‘without permission’ to mean ‘in a manner that
circumvents technical or code based barriers in place to restrict or bar a user’s access.’” (quoting
Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2012))).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217, 222(A).
205. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 637 (4th ed. 2016) (“A plaintiff suing for battery does not
establish the defendant’s intent merely by proving that the defendant appreciated or should have
appreciated that his actions posed a risk of harmful or offensive contact . . . . Rather, the plaintiff
must establish that the defendant actually knew that his actions would cause such contact.”); id.
at 638 (“[I]t is very implausible to infer a purpose to cause a harmful touching from mere statistical
knowledge.”).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18, 21, 35; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note
205, at 683 (“Accidental confinements, such as confinements arising out of misunderstandings,
are ordinarily not actionable as false imprisonments.”).
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can engage in remote interference without coming onto another’s
land.207
Given these various contractual hurdles, would-be claimants will
need to look to products liability and negligence, which classically have
provided redress for physical harms regardless of contractual
agreements. However, as described in the following two sections, rote
applications of products liability and negligence standards may not
sufficiently incentivize consumer safety.
B. Products Liability Problems
Modern products liability law considers how best to allocate
liability for harms arising from consumer use of a product, based on
what the seller can, does, or should know about the product being sold
and the foreseeable uses, misuses, and extraneous harms that might
arise.208 Corporations cannot contract out of products liability claims,
and these claims create a route of recourse for those not in privity with
a company to bring suit, which will often be relevant in the IoT context.
But while it is natural to look to products liability law to remedy harms
caused by corporate remote interference, none of the three main
products liability claims—that there is a manufacturing defect, design
defect, or informational defect—map well onto these situations.
Certainly, existing products liability law can be applied to IoT
devices.209 As with any other product, “smart” devices can be poorly

207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329. Similarly, remote interference will not
usually implicate nuisance, the tort of unreasonable interference with a person’s right to the use
and enjoyment of their land. Id. § 822. That being said, a creative court might draw on trespass
and nuisance concepts to create a new common law tort to address harms arising from remote
interference. Cf. Jack Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1165 (2018)
(proposing “algorithmic nuisance,” a new claim grounded on the idea that platforms should not
be able to “externalize the costs of their operations onto strangers”).
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 202, § 98.
209. IoT devices do introduce some confusion into products liability law. While software has
traditionally not been considered a product, an IoT device’s integration of software with a
physical object raises the issue of whether it is a component part subject to strict liability for
defects. See, e.g., Paez & La Marca, supra note 152, at 58–60; Scott, supra note 175. Also, it is
unclear whether poor cybersecurity practices constitute a design defect or breach of implied
warranty. See Butler, supra note 13 (arguing that companies could be held liable for harms caused
by hacked IoT devices); Elvy, supra note 14, at 85 (“The failure of an IOT manufacturer to secure
an IoT device or the data generated by an owner’s use of an IOT device should serve as the basis
for breach of implied warranty claims under Article 2 [of the U.C.C.].”); Paez & La Marca, supra
note 152, at 56; see also Baker v. ADT Corp., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180138, at *27–36 (C.D. Ill.
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designed, improperly manufactured, or inadequately labeled.210 When
harm is caused by a design defect, manufacturing defect, or insufficient
warning, it can be addressed under the appropriate standard.211
Further, sellers’ growing information about, access to, and control over
their products could significantly expand their obligations, as sellers’
increased knowledge could increase their liability for design or
informational defects,212 postsale failures to warn,213 and even postsale
failures to update.214
But none of these claims squarely address the possibility of a
company interfering with how a device functions, either as a
dispassionate policy or as a malicious act. This is hardly a
manufacturing defect;215 the possibility of remote interference is a
feature, not a bug, of IoT devices. And informational-defect or failureto-warn claims will likely fail, assuming that the terms of service
notified the purchaser about the possibility of remote interference and
its potential consequences.216
If anything, remote interference that results in harm might be
considered a design defect. Design defects exist when a product is
inherently dangerous or useless, because (1) it fails to meet consumer
expectations regarding the product’s safety, (2) it fails a risk-utility test,
or (3) the risks associated with its use could have been corrected with
a reasonable alternative design.
2015) (dismissing a claim of strict products liability regarding a hacked security system on the
ground that it was precluded by the economic-loss doctrine).
210. For example, in In re Toyota Motor Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010),
plaintiffs alleged classic products liability claims: first, that their cars had a software defect that
caused them to accelerate even while the driver was applying the brakes; and, second, that the
company had failed to warn purchasers of the risk of unintended acceleration. Id. at 1192.
211. Manufacturing-defect cases tend to apply a strict liability standard; design- and warningdefect cases usually apply some variant of a negligence analysis. See Gifford, supra note 32, at
119–21.
212. Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1802.
213. Id. at 1802–04 (discussing how rationales for limiting a postsale duty to warn are
undermined by the increasing amount of information available to sellers about postsale product
use).
214. Id. at 1805–08.
215. Manufacturing defects happen in the manufacturing process, often due to poor-quality
materials or workmanship. See generally LEWIS BASS & THOMAS PARKER REDICK, PRODUCT
LIABILITY: DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING DEFECTS § 4:8 (2d ed. Sept. 2018).
216. Informational defects and postsale failures to warn exist when a product has a
nonobvious risk that could be lessened by an adequate warning. Most IoT contracts include notice
of the possibility of remote interference. Indeed, in the context of licensed software, the law
already “requires written notice of the possibility of electronic self-help.” Cohen, supra note 12,
at 1112.
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For claims to succeed under the consumer-expectations test, a jury
must find that the product did not function as safely as a reasonable
consumer might expect.217 Automobiles, coffee makers, and many
other IoT devices do not obviously depend on the remote provision of
services, and so a jury today might decide that a reasonable consumer
could find certain kinds of remote interference unreasonably
dangerous. However, this claim’s strength depends in part on how the
social norms and relevant law evolve. Even today, contractual notice
of remote interference will undermine claims that the consumer did not
know it was a possibility. In the longer term, it may become more
commonplace for companies to affect items in our homes, which in turn
may make the possibility of harmful remote interference less and less
surprising—or more and more “expected.”
The risk-utility test weighs a product’s risk of causing harm against
its expected usefulness. While this sounds objective and useful in the
abstract, it is unpredictable in application when the value and damage
potential of an item are both low or both high. For example, certain
IoT devices, like smart fidget spinners, are neither useful nor
dangerous. What would the test proscribe? Alternatively, connected
automobiles, smart-home hubs, and medical devices can increase
convenience or even be life-saving, but they also have a greater damage
potential. Is the risk of harm worth the item’s utility? Unsurprisingly,
courts have tended to apply the test arbitrarily,218 and would likely
continue to do so when evaluating harms caused by corporate remote
interference.
In an attempt to increase predictability, the Restatement (Third)
endorsed the reasonable-alternative-design test.219 To succeed,
plaintiffs need to identify a design flaw and prove that a reasonable
alternative design exists that would have reduced or eliminated the
resulting harm, without increasing other kinds of harm.220 Whether an
alternative design is reasonable requires an assessment of a host of

217. This test, originally a misinterpretation of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and rejected in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, has stubbornly persisted.
Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1705–06 (2003).
218. Scott Wilkov & Elisa Arko, No Alternative Design: An Often-Overlooked Defense to
THE
DEFENSE
47,
48,
Product
Liability
Claims,
2017
FOR
https://www.tuckerellis.com/webfiles/files/DRI%20For%20The%20Defense_Wilcov%20and%
20Arko_April%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A3P-KDT9].
219. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16 cmt. b. (“[T]he alternative to the
product design must increase the overall safety of the product.”).
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factors, including its economic feasibility, its technological feasibility,
and its effect on the product’s longevity, maintenance, repair, and
aesthetic.221 Further, a plaintiff must show that the alternative design is
an actual alternative, rather than an entirely different product, as
“[g]enerally, courts are unwilling to hold manufacturers liable for a
defective design when the only means of making the product safer is to
alter the defining characteristic of the product.”222 For example,
plaintiffs arguing that ionization smoke alarms did not provide
sufficient warnings compared with smoke alarms that incorporated
both ionization and photoelectric technology lost their suit; the court
held that the plaintiffs’ proposal was essentially a design for a different
product.223 Nor will a product be considered defective just because it
was not designed as safely as possible if the proposed alternative design
requires changing a fundamental characteristic.224
These requirements create multiple roadblocks for holding
companies liable for harms resulting from remote interference. An IoT
company could argue that proposed alternative designs would increase
other kinds of harm, would be prohibitively expensive, would be
technologically infeasible, or would essentially create a different
product.225 Further, the alternative-design standard is poorly suited to
solutions which require the creation of new policies and software, as
courts evaluate the design’s appropriateness at the time of sale. For
example, in response to the seemingly obvious claim that starterinterrupt devices should not be able to deactivate cars idling at active
intersections, a starter-interrupt device designer might reasonably
argue that equipping them with an ability to avoid such situations (1)
would be economically infeasible, (2) would create a different product,
and (3) would require the creation of new software to monitor the
speed of the car at the time the device is engaged. Certainly, a court
might still find in the plaintiff’s favor—but it could just as easily identify
precedent justifying a finding for the defendant.
Finally, all three of the design-defect tests face a similar problem:
they assume a static product design, not something that can be
unilaterally altered postsale. Although courts have recognized postsale

221.
222.
claims).
223.
224.
225.

Id. § 2 cmt. f.
Wilkov & Arko, supra note 218, at 50–52 (discussing common challenges to design defect
Hosford v. BRK Brands, Inc., 223 So. 3d 199, 206 (Ala. 2016).
Id. at 204.
Wilkov & Arko, supra note 218, at 50.
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duties, they have been largely limited to a narrow duty to warn.226
However, the Restatement does suggest that sellers and distributers
may be liable for an unreasonable failure to provide appropriate
postsale warnings when they learn of a new potential risk.227
Accordingly, a plaintiff might argue that a company that remotely
alters or curtails a device’s capabilities in ways that foreseeably
increase the likelihood of harm has a renewed duty to issue an updated
warning.
This is, however, a rather low bar. Companies will find it easy to
issue broad updated warnings, and even require users to acknowledge
them to receive a needed system update, without practical effect or a
significant net reduction in harm. As has been repeatedly
demonstrated in the privacy-harms context, contractual provisions
warning only of potential acts rarely provide effective notice.228 Merely
conditioning continued use of an item on acknowledgment of a clause
stating that the company might remotely deactivate the device for any
reason—including but not limited to nonpayment of subscription fees,
refusal to install required updates in a timely manner, public
disparagement of the product, and so on—would hardly minimize
harms resulting from remote interference. Absent more stringent
requirements,229 such postsale warnings will effectively operate as a
corporate liability shield.

226. But see In re Old Carco, No. 09–50002, 2017 WL 1628888, *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28,
2017) (noting that a postsale software update that addressed one problem (a tendency of some
Jeeps to shift into neutral without driver input) but created another (it disabled certain four-wheel
drive capabilities) might create an independent claim, but ultimately finding this question beyond
the scope of the case); Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34 (arguing for increased
postsale duties for IoT companies).
227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). While
there was no uniform or consistent duty to warn at the time the Restatement (Third) was adopted,
more than thirty states have since adopted various versions of this duty. See Tom Stilwell,
Warning: You May Possess Continuing Duties After the Sale of Your Product! (An Evaluation of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability’s Treatment of Post-Sale Duties), 26 REV.
LITIG. 1035, 1037 (2007).
228. See, e.g., Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Consumer Privacy in a Behavioral
World, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1471, 1506 (2018); Kirsten Martin, Do Privacy Notices Matter?
Comparing the Impact of Violating Formal Privacy Notices and Informal Privacy Norms on
Consumer Trust Online, 45 J. LEG. STUD. 191, 195 (2016); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz & Matthew B.
Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45 J. LEG. STUD. 69, 72 (2016).
229. See infra Part III.B.2 (detailing potential expansions of the warning requirement).
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C. Negligence Hurdles: Unclear Duties, Unclear Breaches
Would-be plaintiffs can also bring negligence claims,
notwithstanding contractual terms purporting to limit them.230 To
succeed, the plaintiff would need to show that the IoT company
breached a duty of care—that it had an obligation to do or not to do
something, and it did not satisfy this obligation.231 Depending on the
case-specific facts and the analogies used, this standard may be difficult
to meet in cases involving corporate remote interference.
The existence of a duty and its scope will necessarily depend on
the scenario. The easiest case for finding a duty will be where an IoT
device purports to reduce or mitigate the possibility of a physical harm,
such as an IoT fire alarm or security system, and the device fails to
render that service because of some act of remote interference.232 It is
less clear what duty an IoT company owes a consumer who breaches a
contract—say, by attempting to jailbreak a device or failing to make a
required payment.233 It is also unclear what duty IoT companies owe
consumers to ensure that their remote interference does not enable
intervening sources of harms.234
In the absence of established duties, advocates and courts will cast
about for helpful analogies, and the selection of one over another will
have dramatic legal consequences.235 Given their ability to legally
230. See, e.g., Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 874 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Whether or not the plaintiff is in a contractual relationship with the manufacturer, the plaintiff
can sue the manufacturer in tort only for damages resulting from physical injury to persons or to
property other than the product itself.”).
231. For a negligence claim to succeed, a plaintiff must satisfy four elements: duty, breach,
causation, and injury. This Section assumes an injury has already occurred and considers the
question of whether a duty has been breached; the causation analysis is addressed below. See infra
Part II.D.
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“One who
undertakes . . . to render services to another . . . is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if . . . (b) the
harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.”).
233. “Jailbreaking” devices—altering the software or hardware that limits their use—at
minimum voids warranties and at its most extreme can carry fines or even criminal charges.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2018) (criminalizing the creation or use of
technologies that can disable certain architectural enforcement systems).
234. See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the role intervenors play in the causal chain).
235. Compare Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 435–51 (2014) (reasoning
that the Aereo streaming technology in question is best analogized to a cable system), with id. at
451–63 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the same technology is instead best analogized to a
copy shop and library card). See also Rebecca Crootof, Autonomous Weapon Systems and the
Limits of Analogy, 51 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 51 (2018) (teasing out how different analogies for
autonomous weapon systems implicate entirely different legal regimes).
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assume control of property or discontinue needed services, the three
most obvious potential analogies for IoT companies are repossession
agents, public utilities, or landlords. Accordingly, this Section considers
the implications of relying on these three analogies to determine the
duty IoT companies owe consumers, as well as how that duty might
change should a consumer breach the contractual provisions.236
Repossession agents have remarkably few duties toward
individuals from whom they are taking secured property. So, while it is
tempting to analogize IoT companies to repossession agents in the
wake of a contractual breach, doing so would support a finding that no
duty was breached. Most states simply prohibit trespass or other
actions that would constitute a breach of the peace.237 Twelve states
and Washington, D.C. have licensure requirements, which include
additional restrictions.238 For example, Florida bars repossession
agents from carrying firearms and requires them to maintain an
accurate listing of the repossessed inventory;239 California bans the
disclosure of personal information of individuals whose items have
been repossessed.240 Assuming that an IoT company’s “digital
repossession” does not breach the peace241 and complies with other
relevant state requirements, there is little legal incentive under the

236. As this Section concludes that these various analogies all raise problems, this Article
argues for expanded corporate duties, grounded on the nature of the relationship between the
IoT company and the device user. See infra Part III.B.2.
237. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-609 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (outlining
breach of the peace limitations to repossession); supra note 1 (citing state laws adopting this type
of limitation, among others).
238. These include California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon. and Pennsylvania. State Requirements, AMERICAN
RECOVERY
ASS’N,
INC.
(2019),
https://repo.org/member-tools/state-requirements
[https://perma.cc/JE4X-ABHB]. In other states, repossession agents must have a towing license,
be bonded, or register with the state. Id.
239. FLA. DEPT. OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., RECOVERY AGENT HANDBOOK 7,
https://licensing.freshfromflorida.com/forms/P-00094_RecoveryAgentHandbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
4W7Y-265F]. Florida also requires repossession agents to be physically present for a repossession.
Id. at 12. However, as this seems to presume that the primary, if only, alternative is for an
unlicensed agent to carry out the repossession, id., it is not clear that courts would impose this
requirement when a company engages in electronic self-help.
240. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7508.7 (2014).
241. Causing harm to defendants might constitute a “breach of the peace,” if that phrase is
construed liberally, and courts do have a history of reading it expansively. See, e.g., supra note 89
(citing Connecticut and New York courts, which held that oral protest alone can constitute a
breach of the peace).
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repossession-agent analogy for the IoT company to take care to not
cause foreseeable harms.242
Utility companies may also be a relevant legal analogy,
particularly for IoT companies that provide an ongoing service
necessary for a device’s functionality.243 Utilities have a “duty to
exercise reasonable care to fulfill [their] obligation to provide
continuing service,”244 and, in recognition of the customer’s
dependence, they are required to provide reasonable notice of pending
service terminations.245 In evaluating the reasonableness of the notice,
courts expect the utility to “take into account the likelihood of damage
to the consumer”246 and “act with the care that a reasonable person
would exercise given the consequences of the shutoff.”247 Utility
companies can terminate services in response to a customer’s
contractual violations, including nonpayment, but they cannot use the
threat of discontinued service to coerce or punish customers.248 Given
users’ dependence on utilities, companies cannot create and enforce
arbitrary rules regarding whom they will serve.249
However, there are certain distinctions that limit the usefulness of
the public-utility analogy. First, public utilities only have duties to
those in privity: “[I]n the absence of a contract between the utility and
the consumer expressly providing for the furnishing of a service for a

242. Depending on how direct the harm is, there may be nonlegal market incentives to avoid
causing harm. For example, no company will remotely deactivate a pacemaker in reaction to a
missed payment—aside from the ethical issues, the reputational costs would be prohibitive.
However, given how technology can misdirect responsibility from remote decision-makers to
those closer in time and space to the harmful incident, see infra Part II.D, there will be fewer
market incentives to prevent the enabling of intervening sources of harm.
243. Cf. Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. REV. 57, 76–79 (2015)
(arguing that, when certain industries are necessary to the public and those industries have
leveraged that necessity to consumer disadvantage, governments tend to respond with publicutility-like regulation).
244. Roger D. Colton, Prepayment Utility Meters, Affordable Home Energy, and the Low
Income Utility Consumer, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY. DEV. L. 285, 297 (2001).
245. See id. at 295 (“[I]t may be argued that a utility’s common law right to terminate service
to enforce payment is conditional upon its duty to notify the customer of its intention to do so
prior to exercising that right.”).
246. See id. at 297 (quoting 15 STEPHEN R. PITCHER, AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D § 125
(1978)).
247. Id. at 298.
248. Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and
Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 326 (1962) (“[D]iscontinuance can not be used to coerce a
customer into paying a bill when there is a bona fide dispute concerning its validity.”).
249. See, e.g., Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wis. 539, 547–49 (1858) (voiding
contractual terms allowing the gas company to “capriciously select” whom to serve).
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specific purpose, the public utility owes no duty to a person injured as
a result of an interruption of service or a failure to provide service.”250
If applied in the context of corporate remote interference, the utility
analogy would not protect third-party users or bystanders. Second,
precisely because they have the power to remotely terminate vital
services, utilities are often public and heavily regulated industries,251
and so there may be less of a need to impose additional liabilities on
utilities than would be desirable for a private company with similar
capabilities.
Should a court analogize an IoT company to a landlord, there is a
greater chance that it would find a duty to minimize foreseeable harms
under the IoT company’s control—at least absent a contractual breach.
Landlords have affirmative duties to protect the safety of their tenants.
After Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.252
established landlords’ tort liability for a third party’s criminal actions,
almost all jurisdictions have found that landlords have a duty to keep
common areas relatively safe, including both the physical premises and
the overall environment.253 Generally, landlords are liable for
negligence when “there is a ‘special relationship’ between the landlord
and tenant” and when “there are ‘special circumstances’ by which the
landlord’s act or omission expose[d] the tenant to an unreasonable risk

250. 53 CAL. JUR. 3D, Public Utilities § 149 (1979) (citing White v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 25 Cal.
App. 4th 442, 435–36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).
251. As one scholar has described the power that utility companies have:
There are some firms whose control over basic necessities and infrastructure
create a greater moral danger of unaccountable power than ordinary firms or
businesses. . . . Public utility regulations were seen as vital for regulating those
private actors operating in goods and services whose provision seemed to require
some degree of market concentration and consolidation—and whose set of users
and constituencies were too vast to be empowered and protected through more
conventional methods of market competition, corporate governance, or ordinary
economic regulation.
K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the
Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1639 (2018).
252. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 486–88 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(allowing tenants to sue their landlord for injuries arising from a criminal assault and robbery in
the common hallway).
253. See B. A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing
Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679, 682 (1992)
(stating that tort standards “have evolved from narrow exceptions, to a general rule of immunity,
to a broad duty of care”). This “duty to provide a reasonable amount of security in common areas
extends to preventing foreseeable injuries within the leased premises as well.” Catherine A.
Hodgetts, Torts, in The Maryland Survey: 2002-2003, 63 MD. L. REV. 971, 971 (2004) (reviewing,
among other recent decisions by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Hemmings v. Pelham Wood
L.L.L.P., 375 Md. 522 (2003)).
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of crime.”254 The foreseeability of the harm and the landlord’s ability
to control it are often determining factors in finding a duty.255
However, the landlord analogy may only create a duty of care for
IoT companies in situations where there is no contractual breach.
Should a tenant breach a lease—say, by failing to pay—landlords can
evict them,256 and landlords can often engage in self-help to do so as
long as they provide the required notice and do not breach the peace.257
It is unclear whether landlords have any other duties to minimize harm
to tenants after nonpayment. For example, landlords do not have a
duty to consider the implications of extreme weather258 or to check for
pets before changing the locks.259 Applying the landlord analogy would
allow IoT companies to engage in remote interference in response to
contractual breaches with nearly no liability, although possibly subject
to a notice requirement.
If courts took to analogies for guidance, the choice of analogy will
determine the scope of the IoT company’s duty. Assuming the harmed
user did not breach the contract, both the utility and landlord analogies
provide some basis for finding a duty of care to minimize foreseeable
harms. The landlord analogy provides slightly more support for a
finding that IoT companies owe a duty to everyone with whom they
share a special relationship, rather than just to those with whom the
companies are in privity. It also supports finding a duty to avoid

254. Glesner, supra note 253, at 702.
255. See id. at 686 (noting that, in some jurisdictions, “the landlord’s liability is determined by
balancing the foreseeability and reasonableness of the risk of injury against the ability of the
landlord to reduce that risk”); Irma W. Merrill, Landlord Liability for Crimes Committed by Third
Parties Against Tenants on the Premises, 38 VAND. L. REV. 431, 441 (1985) (reviewing
precedential cases where courts have considered “areas that the landlord controls” and
“foreseeability of the crime”).
256. See Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing Security of Tenure for Residential Tenants: Good
Faith as a Limitation on the Landlord’s Right to Terminate, 19 GA. L. REV. 483, 538 (1985)
(observing that “the most common reasons for eviction relate to the tenant’s performance,”
including nonpayment or other violations of lease terms).
257. E.g., Thomas M. Whelan, Enforcement of Commercial Leases: Evictions and Dealing
with a Tenant’s Personal Property, 3 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 283, 290–91 (1997) (discussing
Texas landlord–tenant statutory and contractual self-help remedies).
258. See Pam Fessler, As Temperatures Fall, No Halt to Evictions Across Most of the Country,
NPR (Dec. 18, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/18/570796464/as-temperatures-fallno-halt-to-evictions-across-most-of-the-country [https://perma.cc/PN4U-YD9X] (“A few places,
like Maryland and Washington, D.C., postpone evictions when it’s below freezing and over the
holidays, although those places are the exception rather than the rule.”).
259. Carl Campanile, Proposed Law Hopes to Help Trapped Pets After Evictions, N.Y.
POST (Sept. 26, 2017, 4:24 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/09/26/proposed-law-hopes-to-helptrapped-pets-after-evictions [https://perma.cc/W8G7-4ZRW].
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creating an environment where IoT device users are likely to be the
victims of criminal acts.260 If the consumer did breach the contract, the
repossession-agent analogy will be tempting, but it suggests the IoT
company owes device users nearly no duty of care. In contrast, both
the utility company and landlord analogies imply the existence of a
minimal duty of notice of the companies’ intent to engage in responsive
self-help, commensurate with the likelihood and degree of harm.
These analogies may well be appropriate for some situations
where corporate remote interference causes harm, but the analogy that
works in one scenario should not be blindly applied in another. Rather,
the appropriate analogy for assessing IoT companies’ duty toward
device users and bystanders must be considered afresh with each new
fact pattern—with an awareness that, in some circumstances, none of
them may achieve the desired social goal.261
D. Seeming Breaks in the Causal Chain
Regardless of whether a suit is grounded in products liability,
negligence claims, or both, a plaintiff will need to demonstrate that the
IoT company’s remote interference caused their harm. Corporate
remote interference can cause harm in three ways: (1) directly, (2) via
induced reliance which then results in harm, or (3) by enabling
intervening sources of harm.
The first two categories have relatively straightforward causation
analyses.262 First, remote interference may be the direct cause of harm,
260. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482 (1970) (“In the case at
bar we place the duty of taking protective measures guarding the entire premises and the areas
peculiarly under the landlord’s control against the perpetration of criminal acts upon the landlord,
the party to the lease contract who has the effective capacity to perform these necessary acts.”).
Common carriers have been found to have a similar duty toward their passengers. See Hines v.
Garrett, 108 S.E. 690, 694 (Va. 1921) (“A carrier, in the discharge of [its] very high duty . . . , is
bound to know the character of the place at which it wrongfully discharges them; and if the
defendant wrongfully require[s] the plaintiff to get off at a dangerous place without knowing it, it
d[oes] so at its peril.”); see also Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A
Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1923 (2010) (noting that, where one entity creates “an
unreasonable risk of criminal misconduct,” it owes a duty of care toward those who will be
foreseeably endangered (quoting Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1006–07 (N.H.
2003))).
261. For a discussion of other means of determining the appropriate scope of duty for
corporate remote interference, see infra Part III.B.2 (articulating a standalone duty and various
possible manifestations).
262. See, e.g., Butler v. Pittway Corp., 770 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that a
malfunctioning smoke alarm “can create an unreasonable risk of harm” and support a products
liability claim because “the inhabitants of a structure who rely on such an alarm may be lulled
into an unjustified sense of safety and fail to be forewarned of the existence of a fire”); Scott &
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as when an implantable medical device is remotely deactivated.
Second, harm may result when a user relies on an IoT device for a
critical alert or alarm, and due to remote interference, the device does
not provide it. For example, in 2016, a man who passed out while
driving due to low blood sugar crashed his car, suffering injuries and
totaling the vehicle.263 He filed a suit against Dexcom, alleging that its
smart glucose monitoring device’s alarm did not go off when his bloodsugar levels dropped.264 IoT medical alerts, fire alarms, carbon
monoxide sensors, and security systems are only useful to the extent
they are functional—unexpected failures foreseeably cause harm.265
The third, and more complicated, situation arises where remote
interference enables an intervening cause of harm. If your car is
disabled while you are idling at a busy intersection, there is a higher
likelihood that you will be hit by a car; if your front or garage door is
remotely unlocked, there is a greater chance of burglary or assault.
These situations raise questions about the proper scope of the
proximate cause requirement,266 especially as new technology often
masks the influence and responsibility of remote decision-makers in
enabling intervening actors. Accordingly, the rest of this Section
examines the problem of intervening causes.

Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 493 N.E.2d 1022, 1029 (Ill. 1986) (holding, in a case where
the failure of a fire alarm allowed a “small containable fire . . . [to] spread to engulf the entire
building,” that the contractor who installed the fire alarm could be found negligent and thus held
liable to neighbors injured by the fire).
263. Emily Field, Blood Sugar Monitor Maker Hit with Suit over Car Crash, LAW360 (Aug.
31, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/834866/blood-sugar-monitor-maker-hit-with-suitover-car-crash [https://perma.cc/SC6Q-FD62].
264. Id.
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (“Where the
reliance of the other, or of the third person, has induced him to forgo other remedies or
precautions against such a risk, the harm results from the negligence as fully as if the actor had
created the risk.”).
266. Proximate cause was originally developed to limit the scope of negligence. As Judge
Cardozo wrote, “the orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be
the orbit of the duty.” Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 343 (1928). As products
liability expands, courts are increasingly relying on proximate cause to limit the scope of liability.
Where “the type of harm, manner of harm, or class of persons” harmed is unforeseeable,
proximate cause shields manufacturers from liability. David A. Fischer, Products Liability—
Proximate Cause, Intervening Cause, and Duty, 52 MO. L. REV. 547, 574 (1987). Under the riskutility test, a “potentially dangerous product is not defective if it is reasonably safe”; under the
consumer-expectations test, dangerous products “are not defective if the danger is known or
obvious.” Id. at 560. Generally, “[i]n cases of this kind, where a defective product produces an
unforeseeable type of harm because of an intervening cause, proximate cause and intervening
cause analyses are interchangeable.” Id. at 562.
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1. Intervening Causes of Harm Versus Enabling Acts. The doctrine
of intervening causes applies in situations where an unforeseeable act
occurs and breaks the chain of causation. In Stahlecker v. Ford Motor
Company,267 a woman’s car failed in a remote area, and a man found,
raped, and murdered her.268 Her parents sued the car company, alleging
that the car’s inoperability had caused their daughter’s death. The
court dismissed the case, reasoning that the murderer’s actions were
“independent and intervening” and that the car company “had no
reason to expect intentional tortious or criminal acts by a third
person.”269 Similarly, IoT companies could argue that intervening
events break the chain of causation linking their possibly negligent
actions to the consumers’ injuries. A company may have bricked your
car while you were in an intersection, but it is the other driver that hit
you. They may have deactivated your door lock, but it was the burglar
who assaulted you.270
The fact that there may be an intervening cause of harm, however,
does not necessarily imply that the harm was unforeseeable—or that
the entity that enabled it should not be held liable. In Addis v. Steele,271
for example, the court held that an inn was liable for the injuries
residents suffered in a fire set by an arsonist.272 Although there was an
intervening criminal cause of harm, the lack of an escape route created
a situation where injury from a fire was foreseeable.273 Similarly,
landlords have a duty to take measures within their power to protect
tenants from intervening criminal actors274 and business owners have a

267. Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co., 667 N.W.2d 244 (Neb. 2003).
268. Id. at 249–50.
269. Id. at 251 (quoting the district court opinion).
270. The affirmative defenses of contributory negligence, comparative negligence, and
assumption of risk might partially or completely bar recovery where the individual’s actions
increased the likelihood of harm. Take the example of the car stranded in an intersection: an
individual who left a car and was subsequently hit by another presumably knew of the hazardous
nature of the situation and willingly exposed himself to it, which suggests the IoT company should
not bear full responsibility for the injury.
271. Addis v. Steele, 38 648 N.E.2d 733 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
272. Id. at 438.
273. Id. (citing Fund v. Hotel Lenox of Boston, Inc., 635 N.E.2d 194 (Mass. 1994)).
274. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(“[The landlord’s] duty is to take those measures of protection which are within his power and
capacity to take, and which can reasonably be expected to mitigate the risk of intruders assaulting
and robbing tenants.”).
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duty to take reasonable measures to minimize the risk of foreseeable
criminal acts.275
These are all examples of what torts scholar Robert Rabin has
termed “enabling torts”: situations where, in addition to an immediate
perpetrator of harm, a plaintiff has a claim against “the individual, or
more often, the enterprise, that set the stage for the suffering that
unfolded. The Enabler.”276 Rabin argues that enabled torts do not
depend on a relationship between the enabling defendant and the
injured plaintiff; however, the existence of a relationship between IoT
companies and users makes the case for liability “at least as strong if
not stronger.”277
Ultimately, if the intervening source of harm is sufficiently
foreseeable, the causation requirement linking corporate remote
interference to an individual’s injury is satisfied; if not, the intervening
source of harm breaks the chain. As discussed in the next subsection,

275. See, e.g., Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So.2d 762, 766 (La. 1999) (stating that the
court “join[ed] other states in adopting the rule that although business owners are not the insurers
of their patrons’ safety, they do have a duty to implement reasonable measures to protect their
patrons from criminal acts when those acts are foreseeable”); Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690, 695
(Va. 1921) (finding a train operator negligent for carrying a woman past her stop, as she was then
raped while walking back through a bad neighborhood).
While many courts are wary of extending the Posecai reasoning, most reiterate its
standard, and some have relied on it to find questions of fact regarding whether business owners
might have reasonably foreseen harms from third parties. See, e.g., Patton v. Strogen, 908 So.2d
1282, 1288–89 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (using Posecai as a baseline standard from which to determine
liability); Williams v. State, 786 So.2d 927, 932 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (same).
276. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 437–38 (2000); see also John
C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The Restatement
(Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1211, 1211–12
(2009) (noting that the “prevailing doctrine” in negligence law is to “recognize special rules that
allow for, but also limit, remote-wrongdoer liability). “Enabling torts” might include negligent
entrustment, “key in the ignition cases,” premise-violence cases, hazards in the workplace cases,
secondhand-smoke cases, and suits against handgun manufacturers and distributers. See generally
Rabin, supra (surveying these forms of “enabling torts”).
277. Id. at 442. But see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 276, at 1238–40 (arguing that liability
attaches in Rabin’s examples because there was a special relationship between the parties, even
when one party is a stranger, creating an affirmative duty that was breached). Other “enabling
torts” in the IoT context might include companies incurring liability when their weak
cybersecurity practices permit third-party criminals to exploit known vulnerabilities, see Michael
L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1553, 1586 (2005) (suggesting elements for a prima facie case of negligent enablement
of cybercrime), particularly if they permit hackers to interfere with IoT devices in ways that cause
physical harm, see Butler, supra note 13, at 921–22 (arguing that the economic-loss rule should
not bar recovery for such claims, as “[u]nlike defective business software or other products
previously considered, the security vulnerabilities that plague IoT devices threaten damage to
private property and create unique risks to innocent bystanders”).
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however, the foreseeability analysis may be affected by technology’s
tendency to obscure the role of remote decision-makers.
2. Technology Deflects Responsibility. Not only do IoT devices
enable corporate remote interference, they also mask the role of IoT
companies in enabling the resulting injuries. Technology can shift
responsibility from those who make decisions at a distance to those
more temporally and physically close to an accident, even when the
distant decision-makers had more power to minimize its likelihood or
impact.278 This occurs in part because remote decisions are obscured by
later actions279 and in part because courts tend to find that early users
of new technology assume the risks and should shoulder the resulting
harms.280 Sometimes this attribution is sensible, as when individuals
involved in an accident are able to take steps to minimize a risk of
harm; sometimes it is not, as when those immediate actors are
presumed to have more power than they do.281
Given how technology can mask the role of remote decisionmakers, intervening sources of harm are likely to be viewed as
278. See Madeleine Clare Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human Robot
Interaction 40 (Engaging Science, Technology, and Society, Working Paper, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757236 [https://perma.cc/VQS9-LP6B]
(highlighting how “the human in a highly complex and automated system may become simply a
component—accidentally or intentionally—that bears the brunt of the moral and legal
responsibilities when the overall system malfunctions”); Molly K. Land & Jay D. Aronson, The
Promise and Peril of Human Rights Technology, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW AND PRACTICE, 1, 11–12 (Molly K. Land & Jay D. Aronson, eds., 2018) (discussing how,
because technology obscures agency, it interferes with traditional human-rights enforcement
mechanisms); Ryan Calo, Robots in American Law 36 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author) (Mar. 15, 2016) (observing that judges have a tendency to attribute liability to the person
“in the loop” over a robotic system). This is particularly true for accidents resulting from design
decisions, which indirectly regulate users’ actions. Cf. LESSIG, supra note 45, at 133–35 (describing
how regulatory “[i]ndirection misdirects responsibility,” sometimes allowing a regulating entity
to “get[] the benefit of what would clearly be an illegal and controversial regulation without even
having to admit any regulation exists”). Nor is this a new development: early accidents involving
cars and airplanes were often attributed to user error, rather than the fact that steering devices
detached or engines failed. See Graham, supra note 32, at 1260–66 (discussing examples).
279. E.g., Graham, supra note 32, at 1257 (hypothesizing that a jogger hit by an unheard
hybrid vehicle would probably blame the driver, rather than the vehicle’s lack of an alert noise);
id. at 1260 (noting that, “in situations in which a third party might bring suit, responsibility for the
harm may be shifted away from the technology itself and toward the user’s decisions vis-à-vis the
innovation”).
280. Id. at 1260–61 (“In suits brought by users themselves, the law often regards early
adopters as taking their chances with a technology. . . . [T]he definite tendency [of the law] was to
assign fault to the user, rather than engage in a probing review of the technology.”).
281. Id. (quoting an issue of the magazine Scientific American from 1900 to support the claim
that many automobile accidents occurred when steering wheels detached from the tires).
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independent and unforeseeable actors, rather than the enabled and
expected side effects of remote interference. Consider the common
narrative of autonomous-vehicle accidents. At the time of this writing,
increasingly autonomous vehicles have been involved in a number of
fender benders. Recently, a driverless shuttle bus was involved in a
crash less than an hour into its first deployment when it failed to back
up as the vehicle in front of it began reversing.282 The following article
is characteristic of how such incidents are described:
A driverless shuttle bus being tested in Las Vegas was involved in a
crash an hour into its first day on the job – although it wasn’t the
vehicle’s fault. . . .
The incident is the latest in a series of crashes involving driverless
vehicles, the vast majority of which have been caused by the other
vehicle’s driver.
Almost all the incidents recorded by Waymo, Google’s autonomous
vehicle arm, have been down to human drivers hitting the vehicles,
and a major crash involving Uber’s driverless cars in March was down
to the driver of the other car. . . .
“We were like ’oh my gosh, [the other car is] gonna hit us, it’s gonna
hit us!’ and then, it hit us!” one of the passengers told local
station KSNV. “The shuttle didn’t have the ability to move back,
either. [It] just stayed still.”
A spokesman for the City of Las Vegas said: “The shuttle did what it
was supposed to do, in that it[s] sensors registered the truck and the
shuttle stopped to avoid the accident.
“Unfortunately the delivery truck did not stop and grazed the front
fender of the shuttle. Had the truck had the same sensing equipment
that the shuttle has the accident would have been avoided.”283

Rather than blame the designers who did not anticipate and
address this common scenario or the company who deployed a shuttle
incapable of interacting with human drivers, the narrative repeatedly
blames the third-party operator of a delivery truck, who reasonably
expected the other “driver” to move. Clearly, the delivery truck driver
bears some responsibility for the accident. But even though the

282. James Titcomb, Driverless Car Involved in Crash in First Hour of First Day, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 9, 2017, 12:23 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/11/09/
driverless-car-involved-crash-first-hour-first-day [https://perma.cc/5XB2-6RPL].
283. Id. (emphasis added).
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company and its designers could have made different business and
design choices, their temporal remoteness and relative invisibility shift
blame for the accident to the more immediately involved actor.
E. A Market for Unsafe Remote Interference
But won’t the market solve this problem? Either consumers will
purchase less safe but cheaper devices, demonstrating that the cost
savings is worth the added risk, or they will forego unsafe ones,
incentivizing companies to invest in developing and advertising safer
products.
Unfortunately, the market for IoT devices has significant
information asymmetries and failures that will prevent the invisible
hand from perfecting it. First, there are the usual critiques regarding
the reasonableness of assuming consumers are actually making
informed purchasing decisions based on contractual terms.284 Also,
reputational harms only attach if the company name is tied to an
accident, but as noted above, technology’s ability to deflect
responsibility from remote decision-makers can make it difficult to link
an accident to a company. Further, one technology can sometimes
shield another. For example, many are aware that the first autonomous
vehicle to kill a pedestrian was an Uber car; far fewer know that it was
a Volvo.285 Additionally, rather than creating a market for safer
products, the damage potential of some IoT devices might encourage
industries to collectively downplay the risk of harm. Just as airlines

284. Often, consumers are not aware of or do not understand contractual provisions—in large
part because sellers profit from consumers’ confusion. See, e.g., Yannis Bakos, Florencia MarottaWurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to StandardForm Contracts, 43 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 2 (2014) (“[O]nly about one or two in one thousand shoppers
access a product’s EULA for at least one second, yielding an informed minority of 0.2% that is
orders of magnitude smaller than the required informed minority size in realistic market
settings . . . .”); Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on
the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 427–29 (2009) (finding empirical support for two ways in
which online sellers’ obfuscation increases their profits); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy
Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1883–93 (2013) (arguing
that consumers face structural and cognitive problems in gleaning information from contracts);
Van Loo, supra note 171, at 1324–25 (reviewing claims that big retail shopping is marked by
information asymmetries). Further, even if consumers are aware of the facts, such as the price of
an item, they are often unable to accurately assess the associated risks. See Solove, supra, at 1887–
88 (arguing that consumers have nearly no ability to accurately judge the consequences of sharing
personal information).
285. See, e.g., Wakabayashi, supra note 122 (noting that “the crash in Tempe will draw
attention among the general public to self-driving cars . . . . and the companies advocating for it,”
as opposed to any particular brand).
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have little incentive to market their respective safety scores to a
populace with an irrational fear of crashes,286 autonomous vehicle
companies attempting to lure skeptical buyers have little incentive to
highlight their comparatively low accident rates.
IoT companies’ ability to evade the reputational costs that might
otherwise attend accidents has two consequences, both of which
encourage a market for lemons.287 First, consumers cannot accurately
judge which IoT devices and contracts are safer and therefore cannot
make informed choices when selecting among products. Second, and
consequentially, IoT companies that act with due care are unable to
pass the costs of doing so onto consumers, which will discourage them
from shouldering those costs in the absence of other legal incentives.
Ultimately, the market disincentivizes corporate investment in
designing and manufacturing safer IoT devices.
Granted, reputational costs will attach when an egregious act or
spectacular accident can be tied to a particular IoT company. For
example, Sonos is facing popular backlash and losing customers after
announcing that customers who do not agree to policy changes that
allow more intensive data gathering would not receive necessary
software updates;288 Tesla’s stock crashed following an investigation
into a fatal accident.289
But even a sensational story may have relatively little impact, as
companies are increasingly attempting to lock consumers in
proprietary ecosystems.290 Company X’s smart toaster may receive

286. Jack Linshi, Why Airlines Don’t Talk About Safety in Their Ads, TIME (Jan. 20, 2015),
https://time.com/3669161/airline-ads-safety [https://perma.cc/3UCQ-S8PB] (“Putting the ‘SWord’ in slogans or commercials, airlines have found, doesn’t reassure passengers—it just
reminds them of the random chance of danger their next trip might bring, however slight it may
be.”).
287. Akerlof, supra note 31, at 488 (arguing that, when consumers cannot distinguish between
high- and low-quality (or safe and unsafe) products, “good” products are crowded out by “bad”
ones).
288. See Nick Whigham, Sonos Customers React Angrily to New Privacy Policy, NEWS.COM
(Aug.
24,
2017,
8:45
AM),
https://www.news.com.au/technology/homeentertainment/audio/sonos-customers-react-angrily-to-new-privacy-policy/newsstory/3e088c4055685c1aed4ee5856bc353ce [https://
perma.cc/ZYT7-B8ZG].
289. Lora
Kolodny
&
Ari
Levy,
Tesla
Shares
Drop
After
Report
Says its Autopilot System Was Engaged During a Fatal Crash, CNBC (May 17, 2019, 3:24 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/17/tesla-shares-fall-on-report-autopilot-system-was-engagedduring-crash.html [https://perma.cc/98T7-YVPP].
290. See Patrik Fältström, Market-Driven Challenges To Open Internet Standards 7–8 (Global
Comm’n on Internet Governance, Paper Series No. 33, 2016) (noting that many IoT companies
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terrible reviews, but that might not be sufficient for someone enmeshed
in Company X’s network to switch to Company Y’s smart toaster,
given that the latter could not interact with the other items in their
smart kitchen. Further, “in addition to traditional forms of lock-in,
personal data introduces a form of monopoly power that deepens the
connection between buyer and seller. Switching opportunities are not
‘just a click away’ when the competitor lacks the advantages gained
from years of developing personalization and knowledge about the
user.”291 These ecosystems create significant barriers to entry for
market newcomers, minimizing competition that might foster the
development of safer IoT devices.292 Ultimately, in a situation defined
by power and information asymmetries and high switching costs, we
cannot rely on the market to produce safe IoT devices.
*

*

*

Regardless of one’s theory of tort law, the current situation is
problematic. Under a fairness theory, IoT companies are knowingly
creating nonreciprocal and therefore “unfair” risks of harm.293 IoT

are intentionally avoiding open designs that would permit interoperability with other companies’
products). Amazon is just one of many IoT companies interested in creating a siloed ecosystem,
as evidenced by the experience of one commentator:
When you add Amazon Key to your door, something more sneaky also happens:
Amazon takes over. . . . The Key-compatible locks are made by Yale and Kwikset, yet
don’t work with those brands’ own apps. They also can’t connect with a home-security
system or smart-home gadgets that work with Apple and Google software. And, of
course, the lock can’t be accessed by businesses other than Amazon. No Walmart, no
UPS, no local dog-walking company. . . . Amazon is barely hiding its goal: It wants to
be the operating system for your home.
Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon Wants a Key to Your house. I Did It. I Regretted It., WASH. POST
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/12/07/amazon-wantsa-key-to-your-house-i-did-it-i-regretted-it/?utm_term=.e14e2981887e [https://perma.cc/8ULEVS4H].
291. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari & Aaron Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy, 87
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 783, 841 (2019) (footnote omitted).
292. Id. at 840 (discussing how Google and Amazon strategically offer entry-level products at
cheap prices to drive future consumer purchases and raise switching costs, thus creating barriers
to entry for newer companies).
293. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 541–
42 (1972) (arguing that unexcused nonreciprocal risks—where the defendant “generates a
disproportionate, excessive risk of harm, relative to the victim’s risk-creating activity”—unfairly
shift losses); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 311, 343–44 (1996) (articulating an approach that would require an enterprise to
compensate those harmed by its profitable and risky activities, if those harmed do not benefit
from those activities to the same extent as the enterprise, which could also justify imposing
increased liability on IoT companies).
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companies are also not required to make their users whole, despite the
fact they bear at least partial moral responsibility for the resulting
harms.294 And, as the costs of accidents are not being appropriately
allocated, the resulting harms will not be efficiently deterred.295 How,
then, should civil liability standards be changed to better achieve
fairness, justice, and efficiency?
III. A CIVIL LIABILITY INFLECTION POINT
The proliferation of IoT devices has brought us to the cusp of a
potential legal inflection point. Decisions made now about who should
bear liability for harms resulting from remote interference will create
a powerful feedback loop that will forge our future assumptions about
IoT companies’ obligations and consumer rights.
Just as technological development can spur legal evolution, legal
defaults and tech-enabled capabilities influence social norms and
expectations. Law permitted social media and e-commerce platforms
to collect and monetize personal data, creating an environment where
many believe personal privacy is endangered, if not already gone. Law
permits e-book retailers to employ digital rights management
technologies to limit how many people can share a copy, normalizing a
restriction that would have been unimaginable with bound books.

294. Corrective-justice and civil-recourse theories also favor IoT companies bearing more
liability. Under a corrective-justice theory, there are currently inadequate remedies for harms
resulting from the breach of interpersonal duties. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS
320 (1992) (“Corrective justice imposes the duty to repair the wrongs one does.” (emphasis
omitted)). Meanwhile, under a civil recourse approach, IoT companies are inappropriately
evading their responsibility for having wrongfully injured users, largely because those harmed by
remote interference do not have a sufficient legal means of seeking redress. See John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) (“Tort law is best understood
as law that defines duties not to injure others, and that holds those who have breached such duties
vulnerable to their victims’ demands for responsive action.”).
295. Under a Calabresian law-and-economics approach, liability should attach to the
“cheapest cost avoider”—the party best suited to make the “cost-benefit analysis between
accident costs and accident avoidance costs” and to act on that determination. GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26–28 (1970).
While users certainly have some limited discretion with regard to whether they breach contractual
terms and how much they rely on an IoT device, this pales in comparison to the power IoT
companies exercise. IoT companies commission and design devices and, by extension, control
their damage potential. IoT companies also draft the terms of service, which are largely contracts
of adhesion, outlining when they can engage in remote interference. IoT companies also have
more information about the situation and its likely risks, as well as ultimate control as to when
they choose to exert their power to remotely alter or deactivate an IoT device. Lastly, IoT
companies can best spread the costs of accidents.
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Today, law seems to permit IoT companies to engage in remote
interference without having to bear an appropriate amount of liability
for its harmful externalities.
Once social norms are established, they affect how legal questions
are evaluated. If it is generally assumed that IoT companies have an
obligation to avoid causing foreseeable harm, courts and other legal
actors will be more likely to strike exculpatory clauses as
unconscionable, find a design defect in cases regarding harms resulting
from remote interference, or articulate a duty for the purpose of a
negligence analysis. If not, they will not.
After reviewing prior evolutionary moments, this Part offers
proposals for how our civil liability standards could evolve to better
incentivize companies to protect consumers from foreseeable harms
resulting from their remote interference.
A. Evolutionary Moments
The history of tort law is regularly punctuated with instances
where new technologies alter social relations between entities, spurring
legal evolution. The concept of ultrahazardous activities, the creation
of no-fault workers’ compensation and motor-vehicle insurance, and
the rise of mass tort litigation can all be partially traced to underlying
technological changes and accompanying social shifts. Two of the more
momentous examples in American tort law are the development of
modern “negligence” and the products liability revolution. In both of
these situations, courts and legislatures responded to new,
technologically enabled accident crises and changes in power dynamics
by altering allocations of liability—in diametrically opposed ways—to
better achieve social goals. These moments exemplify two possible
ways forward for IoT corporate liability.
1. The Industrial Revolution and Decreased Industry Liability.
Personal injury claims were rare in preindustrial America.296 When
someone brought a case, courts evaluated it under something akin to a
strict liability standard.297 To the extent preindustrial cases mention
“negligence,” the term usually entails a defendant’s failure to fulfill a

296. Gifford, supra note 32, at 80–83.
297. HORWITZ, supra note 32, at 85.
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duty toward a specific other, such as a shopkeeper’s obligation to
deliver a purchased item in good condition to the purchaser.298
The Industrial Revolution—and the advent of machines with “a
marvelous capacity for smashing the human body”—changed
everything.299 Locomotives, automobiles, steamboats, and factory and
mining machines created “an accident crisis like none the world had
ever seen.”300 Additionally, for the first time in history, the majority of
these serious accidents were impersonal, “stranger” cases. Instead of
being harmed by a family member, neighbor, or other familiar person,
people were being mangled by machines whose owners they did not
know—and whom they were far more willing to sue.301
As more and more personal injury suits were brought, courts
began changing the standard under which they evaluated claims, from
strict liability to the modern negligence analysis.302 Whereas it had once
been sufficient to show that the defendant caused an injury, plaintiffs
now also needed to demonstrate that the defendant had not acted with
reasonable care.
Scholars have posited different explanations for this shift. Edward
White links the development of modern negligence to the explosion in
“stranger” cases, arguing that courts had to develop a new standard to

298. See, e.g., id. at 85–88 (discussing early nineteenth-century negligence cases, including
those involving the public duty of sheriffs); WHITE, supra note 32, at 13, 15 (“Prior to the 1830s,
with the exception of a handful of cases in New York, the term ‘negligence’ generally referred to
‘neglect’ or failure to perform a specific duty imposed by contract, statute, or common law.”). But
see W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 700 (2008)
(arguing that, prior to the Industrial Revolution, there was a “default duty of care”).
299. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 467; see also WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 32,
at 7–8 (describing the evolution of Justice Holmes’ analysis of tort law, from the individual injuries
of Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850), to a more collective response to the injuries
created by industrial progress).
300. See Witt, Toward a New History, supra note 32, at 694.
301. Gifford, supra note 32, at 89–90. Gifford also argues that a host of other social and legal
shifts made bringing personal injury suits easier and more appealing. These included the
emergence of deep-pocketed corporations, id. at 89, the creation and expansion of liability
insurance, id. at 90–91, “the abolition of the witness disqualification rule,” which prohibited
individuals with an interest in the outcome of a case—including the plaintiff—from testifying, id.
at 81, 91–92; see also Witt, Toward a New History, supra note 32, at 753–54 (describing the history
of the witness disqualification rule), and the appearance of a personal injury bar, Gifford, supra
note 32, at 92–93.
302. Gifford, supra note 32, at 93 (“Legal scholars usually agree that the law governing
personal injury claims changed from a strict liability standard in 1820 to a negligence regime by
1870.”).
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address the new relationship between injurer and injured.303 Morton
Horwitz and Lawrence Friedman claim that the law evolved in
recognition of a need to protect fledging industries, namely factories,
mines, and railroads.304 John Fabian Witt suggests that the emergence
of a fault-based liability system can be traced to the influence of
“nineteenth-century political liberalism.”305 Donald Gifford attributes
the rise of modern negligence liability directly to the new technology
and the harms and social practices it enabled.306 All agree, however,
that this legal change resulted in a contraction of industry liability,307 as
it is far more difficult to prove that a defendant breached a duty of care
than that its act caused an injury.
2. Mass Manufacturing and an Expansion in Industry Liability. In
contrast, the rise of mass manufacturing and new transportation
systems spurred the development of products liability law, which
extended manufacturers’ duty of care from those in privity to anyone
who might foreseeably be harmed by their products. Scholars have
described the resulting, primarily post-1960s shift as “among the most
dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal system”308 and as
“the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established
rule in the entire history of the law of torts.”309

303. WHITE, supra note 32, at 16 (“[T]he modern negligence principle in tort law seems to
have been an intellectual response to the increased number of accidents involving persons who
had no preexisting relationship with one another . . . .”).
304. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 468; HORWITZ, supra note 32, at 99–100 (describing the
legal change as providing “substantial subsidies for those who undertook schemes of economic
development”); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century
America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1717–20 (1981) (describing this as the “prevailing
view” and arguing that the shift to negligence was far less dramatic and intentional than Horwitz’s
description).
305. WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 45; see also id. at 45–49 (describing the
difference between the strict liability and negligence standards in terms of “classical legal
thought” concepts, such as separation between private and public spheres and the exercise of
individual rights).
306. Gifford, supra note 32, at 76–77, 104–05 (concluding that the development of the
negligence regime can be explained by “technology in and of itself” and resulting factors,
including “the increased severity of injuries resulting from the proliferation of new machinery”).
307. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 32, at 99–100 (describing the transformation of common
law doctrines “to create immunities from legal liability”); Cardi & Green, supra note 298, at 699
(describing “duty’s first doctrinal appearance . . . as a means of limiting liability”).
308. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985).
309. William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791, 793–94 (1966) (footnote omitted).
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Historically, consumer protections for product-caused harms were
based on privity of contract: only those party to a contract of sale could
bring suit for harms caused by an object.310 As mass production and
cross-country transportation increased the geographic, temporal, and
contractual distance between the manufacturer of a product and the
ultimate consumer, however, courts began to hold companies liable for
the harms their products caused, regardless of whether there was a
linking contract. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,311 Judge Cardozo
argued that manufacturers of products that could “place life and limb
in peril when negligently made” owed a duty of care to direct
consumers, their family members, and even to bystanders to anticipate
and prevent likely harms caused by defective products.312 In Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co.,313 Judge Traynor noted in his famous
concurrence: “As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production
. . . the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a
product has been altered. Manufacturing processes . . . are ordinarily
either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public.”314 And,
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,315 Judge Traynor cited his
Escola concurrence in holding a manufacturer strictly liable for a
product defect.316 Products liability law was born.
The Industrial Revolution and the associated rise of “stranger
cases” prompted courts to contract industry liability; the rise of mass
production and newly distant seller–buyer relations spurred a
reactionary expansion of industry liability.317 The proliferating IoT

310. Winterbottom v. Wright (1842), 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (imposing a privity requirement to
limit liability in early products liability law).
311. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
312. Id. at 1053; Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1217, 1232 (2017) (describing the scope of MacPherson’s holding).
313. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
314. Id. at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
315. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
316. Id. at 901.
317. Products liability law has since continued to evolve, mostly in ways that again contract
industry liability. See generally, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the
American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1263 (1991) (discussing the evolution of products liability and asserting that liability without
defect is undesirable); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure To Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990)
(encouraging courts to develop stricter guidelines for product warning cases); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical
Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990) (pointing to changes in products liability
decisions favoring defendants); Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
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ecosystem and the new relationships it enables herald another
potential liability inflection point.
B. Expanding Corporate Liability
We are at a crossroads. In one potential future, law will continue
to shield corporations from liability for harms resulting from remote
interference. In a world where IoT companies have few incentives to
protect device users from the harms of corporate remote interference,
consumers will come to accept that using IoT devices entails an
assumption of risk, shifting their expectations even in the absence of
contractual protections. In another future, where law evolves to
incentivize companies to better protect consumers, societal
understandings of consumer rights will evolve to create stronger
default assumptions favoring consumer safety.
The remainder of this Part outlines different routes toward that
second future. In some situations, it may be possible to apply existing
tech-neutral doctrine more expansively. For example, implied
warranties or design-defect standards could be interpreted to
encompass postsale corporate actions. Alternatively, it may be clearer
to explicitly articulate tech-specific restatements of existing standards.
Doing so may make it easier to strengthen the unconscionability and
public-policy doctrines, recognize broader relational duties, and
extend proximate cause standards to address the particular issues
raised by corporate remote interference.
Ultimately, given the considerable known unknowns about how
various kinds of IoT devices will be integrated into our society, this
Article does not purport to prescribe one single solution. Instead, it
presents options that advocates, judges, and policymakers should
consider when weighing precedential legal decisions during this critical
but bounded regulatory opportunity.
1. Limiting Corporate Exculpatory Clauses. Contract law might
evolve to better protect IoT-device users, either through strengthening
the unconscionability doctrine or by employing public policy
arguments to limit the scope of corporate exculpatory clauses.

Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994) (considering the exculpatory effect of warnings that
shift responsibility to consumers to protect themselves); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive
Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1992) (examining punitive damages in products liability and describing reform efforts).
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a. Strengthening Unconscionability Claims. At least initially,
courts may find that disclaimers of liability arising from remote
interference—particularly for IoT devices that do not obviously
depend on the remote provision of a service, like an automobile—are
unexpected and therefore void as unconscionable.318 Many today are
startled to learn that a company can remotely boot someone’s car, but
that reaction is already swiftly fading as we become more accustomed
to corporate remote interference. Consequently, grounding legal
conclusions on the fact that remote interference is surprising is not a
tenable long-term approach.319 As we become accustomed to the fact
that companies can remotely affect items in our homes, remote
interference will become less and less shocking, but the consequences
will remain equally harmful.
Strengthening the unconscionability doctrine would better limit
the reach of exculpatory clauses in the context of corporate remote
interference.320 Many of the justifications for a limited
unconscionability doctrine—that the market will solve the problem or
that consumers knowingly assumed the risk—do not hold in the IoT
context, as the market is unlikely to provide the information consumers
would need to make informed choices about the relative risks of
different products.321 Instead, just as provisions that purport to waive
liability for physical harms caused by consumer goods are presumed to

318. See, e.g., Traxler v. PPG Indus., Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 607, 616 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (“Courts
have found a term to be substantively suspect if it ‘reallocates the risks of the bargain in a
objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.’” (quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.,
135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 487 (Cal. App. Ct. 1982))); Acosta v. Fair Isaac Corp., 669 F. Supp. 2d 716,
721 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (“Contract terms which distribute risks in an unreasonable or unexpected
way will be found to be substantively unconscionable.”); Hartland Comput. Leasing Corp. v. Ins.
Man, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (“Only such provisions of the standardized
form which . . . are unexpected and unconscionably unfair are held to be unenforceable.”).
319. See supra Part II.B (discussing how corporate remote interference may become more
commonplace, in the context of analyzing the applicability of products liability law).
320. There is a growing body of scholarship proposing reforms to strengthen the
unconscionability doctrine. See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Curing the Infirmities of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1034–39 (2015) (surveying recommendations
for fine-tuning the doctrine, including recognizing unconscionability as a tort with punitive
damages, expanding remedies to include attorney’s fees, and shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1278–90 (2003) (suggesting that unconscionability be
strengthened with regard to nonsalient contract terms); Lonegrass, supra note 145, at 5 (noting
that courts are increasingly employing a “sliding scale approach” to evaluating consumer
contracts that “deemphasizes traditional, formalist markers of assent” and arguing for its
expanded application).
321. See supra Part II.E.
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be unconscionable,322 provisions that purport to waive liability for
foreseeable physical harms caused by remote interference should be as
well, with a high bar for rebutting the presumption.
b. A Public Policy Argument. Stepping back, it is worth
considering the more fundamental question of whether it is ever
appropriate for IoT companies to contractually evade liability for the
physical harms caused by their remote interference. For devices that
create a risk of physical harm, contract law’s current and much
maligned legal fiction that opening a package or using a device
constitutes agreement to opaque terms of service and corporateliability limitations is no longer tenable.323
There are multiple arguments that exculpatory clauses contravene
public policy. The right to be free from foreseeable product harms
could be considered an inalienable entitlement, which cannot be
contracted away.324 From a law-and-economics perspective, honoring
exculpatory clauses may inefficiently shift the duty of care away from
the entity best situated to prevent, bear, or spread the costs of the
injury.325 There is also precedent for requiring companies to bear the
costs of developing safer products and safer practices: the federal
government requires compliance with various safety standards,326 and
322. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951).
323. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166
U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1135–36 (2018) (“There is a good argument that courts have stretched the
definition of consent too far in the browsewrap cases generally. . . . Consent should mean
informed consent with a reasonable alternative, not simply a legal acknowledgement of the
existence of boilerplate somewhere.”); cf. Tschider, supra note 14, at 110–11 (arguing that IoT
devices “disrupt the historical informed consent model,” as “[a] traditional model of prior notice
followed by consent is not compatible with real-time improvements precipitated by the ‘alwayson’ nature of pervasively connected devices”).
324. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (discussing
inalienable entitlements in property and liability rules). To the extent remote interference can be
portrayed as an intentional tort or gross negligence, it will fit relatively comfortably into
traditional prohibitions on contracting away liability. See supra text accompanying notes 159–69.
325. Applegate v. Cable Water Ski, L.C., 974 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(explaining why exculpatory clauses are disfavored by public policy); see also Dresser Indus., Inc.
v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 507–08 (Tex. 1993) (describing clauses that “relieve a
party in advance of responsibility for its own negligence” as “an extraordinary shifting of risk”);
RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 26, at 138–40 (critiquing the efficiency argument for
exculpatory clauses for harm caused by negligence); Burnham, supra note 176, at 390 (wondering,
in light of the moral hazard raised by enforcement of exculpatory clauses, “if a firm has no liability,
then will it take precaution against accidents?”).
326. These include Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (“FMVSS”) and Occupational
Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) safety standards. The authority for the National Highway
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most states limit companies’ ability to contract out of liability for
physical harms.327
If they are not struck as void, exculpatory clauses should at least
be strictly construed against IoT companies in situations where remote
inference causes consumer harm. This may result in the clauses being
drafted in extremely clear language that better puts the consumer “on
notice of the range of dangers for which he or she assumes the risk of
injury, enabling him or her to minimize the risk by exercising a greater
degree of caution.”328 Finally, if judges strike or strictly construe
exculpatory clauses, they should do so in a way that limits their
application in other and future contracts.329
2. Broadening Relational Duties. The fact that IoT devices foster
a personal and ongoing relationship between companies and users
suggests that the companies have a heightened duty toward users.330
Accordingly, this Article proposes recognizing that IoT companies
have a duty to users and bystanders to refrain from engaging in remote
interference that creates a foreseeable risk of physical harm or
property damage. Put another way, IoT companies have a duty to only
employ remote interference when it is reasonably safe to do so.331
Arguably, this duty is merely a particularized version of a broader,
extant duty of care, given that “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to

Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) to promulgate the FMVSS is found in 49 U.S.C. § 301
(2018); see also Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2018)).
327. See Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, supra note 165, at 6, 9 (“A majority of states hold
that such agreements generally are void on the grounds that public policy precludes enforcement
of a release of liability for harms caused by aggravated misconduct or gross negligence” and
“[m]ost states will not enforce waivers intended to protect the provider against liability for gross
negligence, reckless conduct, willful/wanton conduct, or intentional acts.”).
328. Cox v. U.S. Fitness, LLC, 2 N.E.3d 1211, 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
329. See Beh, supra note 320, at 1031 (noting that, rather than focusing on deterrence “to
serve broader public policies beyond the case at issue,” courts “tend to favor benign forms of
severance of unconscionable terms”).
330. Cf. Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1797 (“[P]roximity will give rise
to the kinds of special relationships that continue to matter in law.”). For example, given that
many companies now can exercise postsale control over property, IoT companies may have an
attendant obligation to restrict the use of potentially dangerous property by malicious or negligent
users. Id. at 1809.
331. Cf. ELLIOT F. KAYE & JONATHAN D. MIDGETT, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
COMMISSION, A FRAMEWORK OF SAFETY FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS: CONSIDERATIONS
FOR CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 2 (Jan. 31, 2019) (“Manufacturers and retailers of IoT devices
and software should anticipate safety concerns as new capabilities are added to the IoT ecosystem
or products are modified, updated or re-purposed throughout their useful lives . . . .”).
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exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of
physical harm.”332 Even so, there is utility in clearly articulating it to
acknowledge the issues particular to the IoT context.
The scope of this duty will necessarily vary based on the nature of
the relationship between the IoT company and device user, the likely
gravity and frequency of harm, and the foreseeability of harm.
Although this Article collectively refers to IoT-device designers,
manufacturers, sellers, and service providers as “IoT companies,” a
court evaluating a claim of harm grounded in remote interference will
need to disaggregate the various entities to determine the scope of their
respective duties. Courts will also need to evaluate the damage
potential of the IoT device on a case-specific basis, as remote
interference with different IoT devices will occur at different rates and
cause different degrees of harm. A deactivated Fitbit is an
inconvenience; a deactivated pacemaker may be a death sentence. The
damage potential of an IoT device will affect what degree of harm is
foreseeable, and the expected use of an item will implicate different
duties owed toward different people. IoT vehicles will be used in
situations where bystanders and third parties may be harmed. IoT
hairbrushes? Not so much. Ultimately, it may be sensible to employ a
balancing test, as the court in Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.333 did in
a related context, suggesting that “[t]he greater the foreseeability and
gravity of the harm, the greater the duty of care that will be imposed
on the business.”334
Additionally, the standard may vary depending on the social
utility of the device and the corporate reason for the remote
interference. If harm results from a blanket change in company policy
designed to benefit the company, there should be a higher standard of
care—and possibly even a rebuttable presumption of strict liability.
However, a lower standard of care might be justified if the corporate
remote interference is a genuine attempt to comply with new
regulations or to act in the best interest of the device’s users or the
larger public.
Analyzing the standard of care for corporate remote interference
in response to user breaches will be particularly complicated. On the
one hand, breaches have built-in notice: a consumer might be assumed

332. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a)
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).
333. Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762 (La. 1999).
334. Id. at 768.
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to know that a missed payment on a subscription service will result in
it being discontinued or that altering a device’s hardware may incur
risks or void warranties. On the other hand, because IoT companies
often write and enforce their own contractual terms, purported
consumer “breaches” deserve close examination. A consumer who
fails to make a monthly payment on the Nest account has less
justification for complaint than a consumer who is tinkering with its
hardware in an attempt to limit its surveillance capabilities.335
This proposed duty is the mirror image of a corporate postsale
duty to update a product to protect consumers from newly discovered
risks. Even staunch critics of a postsale duty to update recognize it is
legitimate when three requirements are met336: (1) “the danger the
product poses [is] so extraordinary, pronounced, or special that a postsale warning will not protect consumers”;337 (2) “the manufacturer [is]
able to identify and locate product owners or users”;338 and (3) “the
manufacturer [is] able to regain control of the product.”339 The same
rationales would support a duty not to remotely interfere with an IoT
device in a way that would foreseeably cause harm.340 Certainly,
postsale warnings alone would not prevent the harms of corporate
remote interference,341 unless they are explicit and nearly
contemporaneous with the risk that spurred the warning.342 And the
IoT company can identify and locate product owners and users because
it is exerting control over the product.
The remainder of this Section considers different potential
manifestations of this duty, including as an implied warranty of

335. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 48 (reporting on efforts to prevent the data of Nest users from
being sent to Nest servers).
336. Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1805–06 (describing the duty to
update as “a rare duty that noted scholars have vigorously rejected and that courts have
repeatedly refused to recognize, with the exceptions purportedly amounting in some cases to
intellectually vacant aberrations” (quotations and footnotes omitted)).
337. Douglas R. Richmond, Expanding Products Liability: Manufacturers’ Post-Sale Duties
To Warn, Retrofit and Recall, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 7, 60 (1999).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Some of the strongest case law precedent for a duty to update has developed in the
aviation context, where—as may be the case in the IoT context—there is both a great risk of harm
and a “close and continuing relationship between [a company] and its customers.” Smith,
Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1806–07.
341. See supra Part II.B.
342. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
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reasonable interference, as an interference defect under products
liability law, and as an IoT-specific informal fiduciary duty.
a. An Implied Warranty of Reasonable Interference. Courts might
create a common law implied warranty of reasonable interference,
prohibiting IoT companies from engaging in remote interference that
results in foreseeable harm either as an element of a breach of contract
claim or as part of a negligence claim. Implied warranties are a
“contorts” solution to a “contorts” problem343: they are “a curious
hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract—a
contractual term promising quality but imposed by law rather than
agreement.”344
There are already a number of common law implied warranties.
As discussed above, implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose accompany sales of goods.345 Others attach to
the provision of services. Most states have some version of an implied
warranty of good workmanship, though they differ on whether this
warranty sounds in contract law or negligence.346 Some courts have
found that architectural design–build contracts have an implied
warranty “of the sufficiency of the plans and specifications for the
contemplated purpose.”347 Residential leases are considered sales of
both shelter and services and have implied warranties of habitability.348

343. Implied warranties, such as the implied warranty of good workmanship, are sometimes
evaluated under contract law and sometimes under tort law. See Amica Mut. Ins. v. Abar Dev.,
LLC, No. CV095032593S, 2013 WL 1800453, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2013) (stating that
the claim was “based on a breach of a contract and not brought independently outside of that
context”); Milau Assoc., Inc. v. N. Ave. Dev. Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (N.Y. 1977) (discussing
the contractual implied warranty of good workmanship as part of a negligence claim); Melody
Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. 1987) (noting that warranties, often
designated as elements of contract law, are not so easily categorized, and that “implied warranties
are created by operation of law and are grounded more in tort than in contract”).
344. Debra L. Goetz, Kathryn L. Moore, Douglas E. Perry & David S. Raab, Article Two
Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1190 (1987).
345. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
347. Robert M. Hanlon, Note, Implied Warranties in Service Contracts, 39 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 680, 687 (1964); see also Kishwaukee Cmty. Health Servs. Ctr. v. Hosp. Bldg. & Equip. Co.,
No. 80 C 1850, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2671, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 1988) (stating, under Illinois
law, even if “an architect does not warrant its services . . . an implied warranty can attach to the
sale of a product by a design/builder”).
348. See, e.g., Park W. Mgmt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1293 (N.Y. 1979) (describing
how a residential lease is a sale of “shelter and services” and carries three implied warranties:
“first, that the premises are fit for human habitation; second, that the condition of the premises is
in accord with the uses reasonably intended by the parties; and, third, that the tenants are not
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While these common law implied warranties do not directly address
harms arising from remote interference with IoT devices,349 they
provide a blueprint for an implied warranty of reasonable interference.
The creation of a new implied warranty is often justified on the
grounds that the common law must evolve to keep up with changing
relationships to “reflect the realities of present day society.”350 Implied
warranties tend to arise where, as here, there is an uneven relationship
between the contracting parties—where one occupies a position of
dependence or vulnerability or the other has superior information or
control and enjoys a position of (possibly unwarranted) trust.351
Relevant considerations include whether one party has induced the
reliance of the other on the former’s skill or knowledge, is better
situated to minimize the likelihood of harm, or is better able to
distribute the loss of accidents.352 These factors all weigh in favor of
creating an implied warranty of reasonable interference, which would
establish liability for harms experienced by owners, users, and
bystanders.353
Breach of warranty claims for bundled good/services products
often flounder at the predominance test, which distinguishes
warranties that attach to goods from warranties that attach to

subjected to any conditions endangering or detrimental to their life, health or safety”); David A.
Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 389, 394 (2011)
(noting that nearly all jurisdictions have adopted the implied warranty of habitability in rental
agreements).
349. Elvy, supra note 14, at 114–17 (discussing why extant implied warranties generally do not
apply to IoT devices and IoT companies).
350. Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1170 (1974); see also id. at 1169 (creating an
implied warranty of habitability for residential leases based on the “realities of the modern urban
landlord-tenant relationship”).
351. Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty
and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 934–35 & n.46 (2006) (describing scholars’
articulations of the characteristics of fiduciary duties); id. at 936–38 (describing various factors
courts have considered in determining whether “a particular relationship warrant[s] the
imposition of fiduciary duties”).
352. Goetz et al., supra note 344, at 1190 n.185.
353. The U.C.C. extends express and implied warranties to bystanders and other third parties
“who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by” a product. U.C.C. § 2-318
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951). Two of the three U.C.C. categories of protected
bystanders have no privity requirement, and while the third is limited to a buyer’s family or guests,
some courts have nonetheless applied it to employees and bystanders. Jennifer Camero, Two Too
Many: Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 86 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 21–23 (2012).
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services.354 An implied warranty of reasonable interference should
dispense with this increasingly artificial distinction and focus instead
on whether the underlying harm was reasonably foreseeable and
preventable.355
Ultimately, however, the creation of an implied warranty of
reasonable interference may only be a temporary solution. Even if it is
nonwaivable and not subject to disclaimers,356 and even if the
contractual standard is lower than the common law version, courts
often defer to contract terms and find express warranties supersede
implied ones. Accordingly, if an implied warranty is created, IoT
companies will undoubtedly respond by including explicit and less
onerous warranties in their terms of service.
b. Interference Defects. Because IoT devices are products, it is
natural to look to products liability law to address their associated
problems. But for products liability law to be applicable, courts may
need to develop a new kind of claim. As discussed above, products
liability law developed in the context of a changed relationship
between companies and consumers. Design defects, manufacturing
defects, and informational or marketing defects can be understood as
identifying different kinds of relationships between consumers and
entities in the products supply chain, where each actor has a different
standard of liability for kinds of caused harm. None of these squarely
addresses the new kind of relationship between IoT companies and

354. Ellen Taylor, Applicability of Strict Liability Warranty Theories to Service Transactions,
47 S.C. L. REV. 231, 252 (1996) (describing the predominant-purpose test as one which determines
whether the U.C.C. applies to contracts for both goods and services by asking “whether [the
contracts’] predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of
service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g. contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction
of sale with labor incidentally involved (e.g. installation of a water heater in a bathroom”); see,
e.g., Elvy, supra note 14, at 105–12 (discussing the predominant-purpose test in the IoT context).
355. In determining that U.C.C. implied warranties attached to utility services, one court
argued that “implied warranties, as defined by the courts of this state, should apply to the sale of
services as well as to the sale of goods. We see no reason upon which a logical distinction can be
based . . . .” Buckeye Union Fire Ins. v. Detroit Edison Co., 196 N.W.2d 316, 317 (Mich. Ct. App.
1972); Taylor, supra note 354, at 264 (“To the extent that implied warranties are intended to
protect consumers, there is no clear basis for treating purchasers of goods differently from
purchasers of services.”).
356. The implied warranty of good workmanship recognized in Texas, for example, is
nonwaivable and cannot be disclaimed. Richard M. Alderman, Warranty Disclaimers and the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, HOUS. LAW., Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 14. But see Centex Homes
v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Tex. 2002) (“The implied warranty of good workmanship serves
as a ‘gap-filler’ or ‘default warranty’; it applies unless and until the parties express a contrary
intention.”).
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consumers, where the company has a postsale ability to remotely alter
how a device functions based on its ongoing surveillance of the user.
Given this context, courts might delineate “interference defects”
as a fourth kind of products liability claim. An interference defect
would exist when remote interference renders a device inherently
dangerous, either because it directly harms someone, deactivates a
relied-upon critical service, or foreseeably enables an intervening
source of harm.357 Interference defects might be evaluated under a
strict liability or negligence standard and have compensatory and
specific-performance remedies.358
Additionally or alternatively, courts could explicitly recognize that
remote interference necessitates more extensive warning requirements
than are currently required. For example, Connecticut is unique in that
it prohibits electronic self-help, unless a “debtor separately agrees to a
term . . . authorizing electronic self-help that requires notice of
exercise.”359 This requirement addresses the need for nearcontemporaneous notification and creates an opportunity for
engagement and negotiation between the parties.360 Similarly, IoT

357. Under this definition, an “interference defect” would cover harms arising from the
actions of both IoT companies and criminal hackers. A more limited definition, focused only on
corporate remote interference, could also be employed.
358. Historically, courts have been reluctant to require specific performance of personal
services, both because of the difficulty in evaluating how well a service is performed, see Alan
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 293 (1979) (“Courts, in enforcing
the supervision defense, are concerned with their inability to supervise performance . . . .”), and
because orders limiting personal freedoms are uncomfortably similar to creating an involuntary
servitude, see Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 2020, 2023 (2009) (rejecting the conventional wisdom that specific performance violates
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude). These concerns are less
applicable in the IoT context. First, unlike the construction of a building or an employment
contract, the services IoT companies provide are roughly fungible: the app used by one consumer
is the same app used by another, even though their data may be particularized. As with public
utility services, these fungible services can be compelled. Cf. The Duty of a Public Utility To
Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, supra note 248, at 329 (noting that
mandamus actions can be used to compel restoration of utility services).
Second, assuming that an IoT company offers these services to multiple customers,
requiring performance for a specific individual hardly implicates the liberty interests of either the
company or its employees. Schwartz, supra, at 297 (“[R]equiring a sizable corporation that
renders services to perform for a given promisee does not violate the corporation’s associational
interests or the associational interests of its employees.”). The case would be somewhat different
if the IoT company was closing that portion of its business; in that situation, requiring specific
performance would be less reasonable.
359. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-609 (2012).
360. Id. (“Before resorting to electronic self-help . . . the secured party shall give notice . . .
stating: (A) That the secured party intends to resort to electronic self-help . . . on or after fifteen
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companies could be required to alert consumers when they intend to
engage in remote interference that might result in harm, with the
timing and strength of the warning designed with awareness of the
damage potential of the act. If the remote interference has been
triggered by a user’s contractual breach, an alert could state the nature
of the breach and provide a means of contacting the company so the
user has an opportunity to dispute the claim and address mistakes.361
This would alleviate some of the concerns about algorithmic
enforcement limiting opportunities for interaction and otherwise
providing insufficient due process.362
Acknowledging a new “interference defect” claim or a heightened
duty to warn might be the best way to address most run-of-the-mill
injuries caused by remote interference. To deter hidden or explicit
abusive action, however, courts might want to consider a third option:
raising the moral bar for IoT companies by finding that they have an
informal fiduciary duty to device users.
c. IoT Fiduciaries. Tort law has long premised certain duties,
particularly those regarding the sharing of personal information, on
legally defined relationships. Doctors, therapists, accountants, and
lawyers are all commonly recognized as fiduciaries—entities who have
a “position of superiority or influence [over another], acquired by
virtue of [a] special trust.”363 In addition to these “formal” fiduciary
relationships, courts often find that “informal” fiduciary relationships
exist where “a relationship of ‘trust’ exists and that one party
dominates, is superior to, or is especially vulnerable to another

days . . . ; (B) The nature of the claimed breach . . . ; and (C) [A representative’s contact
information].”).
361. Cf. Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 560–62
(2016) (describing how customer-service departments address the vast majority of industry–
consumer disputes and the importance of ensuring appropriate procedures to meet both
businesses’ and consumers’ needs).
362. For a discussion of the underlying values of due process, see Danielle Keats Citron &
Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV.
1, 20 (2014) (“[T]he underlying values of due process—transparency, accuracy, accountability,
participation, and fairness—should animate the oversight of scoring systems . . . .” (footnote
omitted)). See generally Citron, supra note 80 (arguing that administrative adoption of
algorithmic decision-making threatens traditional due process rights).
363. Tornado Techs., Inc. v. Quality Control Inspection, Inc., 977 N.E.2d 122, 126 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2012) (quoting Nichols v. Schwendeman, No. 07AP–433, 2007 WL 4305718, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 11, 2007)).
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party.”364 Thanks to the flexible nature of fiduciary law,365 scholars
regularly build on the concept to suggest new duties in relationships
characterized by power, trust, and vulnerability.366
To the extent there is a bedrock requirement for finding a
fiduciary duty, it is that there must be a relationship between the
parties characterized by “high levels of trust” and in which one party is
“in a position of domination, inferiority, or vulnerability.”367 Further,
“[t]he degree of control, complexity, and dominance or the broad range
of the underlying relationship can also help direct courts in figuring out
how strictly to enforce fiduciary duties and how to impose a proper
remedy.”368
When consumers are particularly vulnerable and the risk of harm
is significantly high, courts could recognize an informal fiduciary
relationship that justifies a heightened duty of care.369 Individuals
364. Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 672 (2009). In Bazan v.
Muñoz, 444 S.W.3d 110, 118 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014), the court explained:
[I]nformal fiduciary relationships may arise when one person trusts and relies upon
another, whether the relationship is moral, social, domestic, or merely personal.
Because not every relationship involving a high degree of trust and confidence rises to
the stature of a formal fiduciary relationship, the law recognizes the existence of
[informal fiduciary] relationships in those cases in which influence has been acquired
and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed.
Id. at 118 (citation omitted).
365. See Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136, 139 (Conn. 1955) (“[E]quity has carefully
refrained from defining a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a manner as to
exclude new situations.”).
366. For examples of scholarly articles that call for expansion of fiduciary duties, see generally
Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006);
Thomas L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley Porter, Don’t Let Go of the Rope: Reducing
Readmissions by Recognizing Hospitals’ Fiduciary Duties to Their Discharged Patients, 62 AM. U.
L. REV. 513 (2013); Leib, supra note 364; and Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as
Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995). But see generally Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners
Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209 (calling for limitations on the expansion of fiduciary duties).
367. Leib, supra note 364, at 672; see also Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 366, at 545–46
(discussing the vulnerability of the beneficiary).
368. Leib, supra note 364, at 682–83 (emphasis in original).
369. See DeMott, supra note 351, at 926 (arguing that the law of fiduciary duties can best be
understood as applying in circumstances where there is a justifiable expectation that one “actor’s
conduct will be loyal to the interests of another”).
This would complement Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain’s proposed “information
fiduciary” concept. IoT companies would certainly qualify as “information fiduciaries”—entities
“who, because of their relationship with another, [have] taken on special duties with respect to
the [customer data] they obtain in the course of the relationship.” Jack M. Balkin, Information
Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1209 (2016); Jack M. Balkin
& Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain To Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct.
3,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/informationfiduciary/502346 [https://
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relying on implantable medical devices that regulate necessary life
functions; individuals relying on fire alarms, carbon monoxide
monitors, and other critical alert systems; and individuals using cars
and other items with the capacity to cause significant physical harm
must all trust IoT companies to avoid an ill-timed remote interference.
In these and similar situations, notice of the possibility of remote
interference would not be sufficient to prevent harm; instead,
recognizing these companies as IoT fiduciaries would encourage them
to take more affirmative action to minimize foreseeable harms.370
Given that breaches of fiduciary duties can be addressed with both
compensatory and punitive damages,371 a fiduciary framing would be
useful in addressing abusive self-help practices or other misuses of
power. Certainly, the Garadget company owner—who bricked a
customer’s internet-connected garage door opener in response to a bad
Amazon review372—violated even the weakest version of a duty of
loyalty.373 And a duty of loyalty might also prohibit using remote
interference to limit a device’s abilities with the aim of increasing sales
or otherwise enriching the corporation,374 holding devices hostage to
extort preferable terms, or using data gathered to strategically time
inconvenient or dangerous remote interferences.
3. Extending Causation. Regardless of how a duty not to engage
in remote interference that creates a foreseeable risk of harm is
perma.cc/E98D-KYWN]; see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY
AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 103 (2004) (“I posit that the law should hold that
companies collecting and using our personal information stand in a fiduciary relationship with
us.”).
Under the information fiduciary model, IoT companies would have a duty to refrain from
using data gathered by IoT devices to enrich themselves at the expense of device users. However,
as these duties are limited to data-related harms, recognizing that IoT companies are information
fiduciaries will not address the range of physical harms they may cause. Similarly, doctors are
information fiduciaries—they have a duty not to use patient data to enrich themselves at their
patients’ expense—but a doctor’s fiduciary role toward patients is hardly limited to protecting
their information.
370. See Leib, supra note 364, at 674–75 (“Although the [fiduciary] duty resembles a basic
requirement to avoid negligence, the duty is flexible and can require more substantial diligence
than would be required of non-fiduciaries.” (footnote omitted)).
371. DeMott, supra note 351, at 930.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 104–06.
373. While the duty of loyalty is a core fiduciary duty, “the strictness with which it will be
enforced varies, depending on the type and scope of the fiduciary relationship at issue.” Leib,
supra note 364, at 674.
374. See Mullis, supra note 102 (reporting on how Apple pushed an update that slowed older
iPhones, leading some to allege that the aim was to increase sales of newer versions).
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articulated, courts must also apply a causation standard that
acknowledges how companies’ remote decisions can increase risks to
consumer safety.
As noted above, identifying a causal link between corporate action
and a resulting harm will be relatively straightforward where remote
interference is the direct cause of harm or where an IoT company
induced the user’s reliance on a service or device and then, due to
remote interference, failed to provide it. Intervening causes of harm
and situations where the technology masks the remote decision
maker’s responsibility, however, test the current boundaries of the
proximate cause limitation.
In light of the ongoing relationship between IoT companies and
their device users, situations where remote interference enables
harmful intervenors should be evaluated under an expansive
proximate cause standard. Not only is the IoT company the entity best
situated to have prevented the injury,375 but intervenors will often be
difficult to find or judgment proof, and the law’s “deterrence rationale
would be defeated if those enabling wrongdoing can escape judgment
by shifting liability to individuals who cannot be caught and thus
deterred.”376 Doing so would not unduly stretch the proximate cause
analysis. At least where the defendant has a special relationship with
the harmed individual that gives rise to an affirmative duty,377 courts
are increasingly comfortable expanding causation standards to
encompass situations where a defendant “paved the way for the third
party to injure another,”378 even when that third-party intervenor is a
criminal actor.379

375. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 276, at 444 (discussing how, in the context of apartment
buildings, the enabler is in a better position than the victim to diminish the risk of foreseeable
harm).
376. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1836 (2010)
(citing Rabin, supra note 276, at 444).
377. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 276, at 1238–40, 1243.
378. Citron, supra note 376, at 1836; see also Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001,
1007 (N.H. 2003) (recognizing a “special circumstances” exception where “a duty is owed to those
foreseeably endangered” if a party “create[s] an unreasonable [and foreseeable] risk of criminal
misconduct”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(discussing responses to criminal misconduct); Rabin, supra note 276, at 441–42 (observing that
the erosion of the proximate cause limitation “can be regarded as a temporal shift in moral
sensibilities from a more individualistic era to one in which tort law . . . increasingly reflects more
expansive notions of responsibility for the conduct of others”).
379. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (evaluating causation and liability in the criminal context).
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Expanding the proximate cause analysis does not entail doing
away with it entirely. There will be many fact patterns with intervening
causes that break the chain of causation, or at least weigh against the
company bearing full liability.380 And, just as proximate cause can be
used to avoid underdeterrence, “judges ought to use proximate cause
to avoid overdeterrence. They should also restrict liability in cases
involving the kinds of losses that the public would not want to spread
and involving the kinds of accidents that . . . liability is not likely to
deter.”381 What is important, however, is that causation in these cases
is evaluated with an awareness of how remote interference can enable
certain intervenors and how technology can deflect responsibility from
remote decision-makers.
C. Implementation
IoT companies’ power over device users and bystanders highlights
the need for regulatory intervention.382 For simplicity’s sake, this
Article has implicitly assumed that courts would take the lead in
expanding corporate liability. However, they are far from the only legal
actors who can implement this Article’s proposals.383 This final Section
teases out some of the respective institutional strengths and limitations
of the judicial, legislative, and agency rulemaking processes and of
lawmaking at the state and federal levels.
1. Judicial, Legislative, and Agency Rulemaking. In many ways,
the common law is well suited to address harms resulting from remote

380. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 276, at 1221–23 (providing examples of practical
limits on enabled torts, such as the fact that car manufacturers have no duty to instruct dealers to
refrain from selling to incompetent drivers, even though it is foreseeable that such drivers will
purchase cars).
381. Fischer, supra note 266, at 582.
382. Cf. Rahman, supra note 108, at 240 (arguing that similar power imbalances in other
contexts “justified regulatory interventions to redress issues like fraud, barriers to access,
information asymmetries, and bargaining disadvantages”).
383. Common law tort concepts are often relatively tech-neutral standards that have stood
the test of time; given this, legislatures and agencies regularly draw on tort principles as a guide
for more tailored rulemaking. For example, a draft bill was proposed in the Senate that responded
to the Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal and drew heavily on the tort law concept of
fiduciary duties to articulate what duties information platforms owe their users. The bill died in
the 115th Congress and has not been renewed. See Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. §
3(a) (2d Sess. 2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3744/text
[https://perma.cc/Z96H-SMA7] (“An online service provider shall fulfill the duties of care,
loyalty, and confidentiality . . . .”).
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interference.384 While delayed and reactive, common law legal
evolution ensures that problems are addressed as they arise, avoiding
limiting potentially beneficial innovation through early and overbroad
rulemaking.385 Individual plaintiffs bring tort suits in response to the
harms that matter to them.386 Courts are able to review situations on a
case-by-case basis and calibrate liability to the device, its damage
potential, the nature of the relationship between the IoT company and
consumer, the foreseeability of harm, and the actual amount of harm
caused. Meanwhile, the potential breadth of common law torts
incentivizes industry to consider all of the harms a new technology
might cause, rather than only those identified in an agency’s
mandate.387 While an agency may have limited claims it can consider,
common law judges must evaluate all complaints that come before
them. And while an agency is subject to regulatory capture, a common
law judge is relatively independent.
Ideally, over time, the common law will “work itself pure.”388
However, tort law will only evolve rigorously if these cases make it to
court, and there are a host of legal and practical barriers that will
prevent them from doing so. Should IoT companies engage in remote
interference without notice, users may not even know their device has
been modified. Technology’s tendency to misdirect responsibility away
from remote decision-makers likely affects which entities people blame
for harms resulting from remote interference.389 Injured individuals
may also be deterred by high litigation costs or an assumption that

384. See, e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137, 162–63
(1995) (enumerating the benefits of tort’s case-specific method for addressing harms caused by
new technologies); Douglas A. Kysar, The Public Life of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk
Regulation Mechanism, 9 EUR. J. RISK REG. 48, 65 (2018) (arguing that courts are uniquely well
suited to evaluating whether an action violates a plaintiff’s common law entitlement to be free
from wrongful injury).
385. Of course, common law responses to particular situations can sometimes create rules that
are overbroad or inappropriate when applied in others.
386. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 291, at 171 (“Perhaps the most attractive feature of using
private law is that harmed consumers will be in the best position to advocate for themselves,
rather than relying on the government to acquire information about various harms and regulate
companies accordingly.”).
387. Lyndon, supra note 384, at 163.
388. Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73–74 (2003) (“[N]ew forms of
technology create . . . new forms of resource use, [which] might not map well with the existing
framework of property rights. A common law system . . . should be able to respond to these
changes both by preserving what makes sense in the older system and by changing what does
not.”).
389. See supra Part II.D.
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potentially void contractual terms are enforceable.390 Given that many
harms caused by remote interference may be relatively minor, class
action suits may be the only means by which consumers could
affordably bring the kinds of complaints that would allow the relevant
common law to develop. But courts often enforce mandatory
predispute arbitration clauses that eliminate the right to a jury trial and
aggregate remedies, such as class action suits.391 Even if some plaintiffs
win suits or arbitrations challenging certain contract provisions,
nondisclosure provisions may mean that other potential plaintiffs
never learn that certain terms are unenforceable; furthermore, contract
damages in the relatively few successful cases may not be sufficiently
high to deter companies from continuing to employ these generally
lucrative terms.392 Finally, as tort law provides only ex post and
imperfect remedies, an overreliance on a tort law solution may result
in a societal failure to avoid foreseeable harms that will dramatically
impact individual lives.393
Furthermore, while courts may be good at calibrating liability in
individual cases, they may not be the best institutions to weigh the
varied social concerns raised by IoT devices.394 For example, increasing

390. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 26, at 145; see also Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the
Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Evidence from the Residential Rental Market,
9 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 1, 8–10 (2017) (discussing how landlords regularly include deceptive and
clearly invalid terms in their contracts, which significantly affects tenants’ decisions to forgo valid
legal rights and claims); Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract
Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1133 n.22 (2009) (“[I]nvalid [contractual] terms continue to be used
by those who are well aware that they are unenforceable as written, presumably because . . . the
other party to the contract . . . either does not realize the clause is unenforceable as written or is
not willing to risk the resources needed to establish its invalidity.”).
391. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 26, at 143. Arbiters also tend to be more deferential
to contractual language, further limiting the reach and import of tort law. See Alan Scott Rau,
The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 449, 451–52
(2005) (focusing on the contractual nature of arbitration and the freedom of parties to make
private choices about how to resolve their disputes); see also Joshua D.H. Karton, The Arbitral
Role in Contractual Interpretation, 6 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1, 2–3 (2015) (discussing this
in the international arbitration context). Further, choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clauses
mandate litigating in jurisdictions where the law favors the firm or makes it more difficult for
plaintiffs to bring suit. Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 26, at 143.
392. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 26, at 145.
393. Cf. Kysar, supra note 384, at 20 (“Legislative and regulatory approaches may work well
on a prospective, industry-wide or economy-wide basis, but they often contain no compensatory
provisions at all for those particular parties who have suffered or will continue to suffer.”).
394. Cf. id. (noting that judges are often considered “normatively inappropriate decision
makers for the sensitive societal tradeoffs involved in . . . safety decision making”); Hoofnagle et
al., supra note 291, at 171 (“[P]rivate law is limited in the sense that it does little to prevent the
macro, economy-wide effects of tethering, such as the competitive drain caused by lock-in.”).
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liability will incentivize IoT companies to take more safety precautions,
but it will also justify additional corporate surveillance.395
Alternatively, there may be situations where a connected device has
information that the user is incapacitated or intends to commit an
illegal act—say, a car might recognize that its driver is inebriated—and
depending on what social values we privilege, we may prefer that the
device does not operate.396 Increasing corporate liability may chill
innovation, but a light chill may be warranted if the alternative is
significant risk to consumers’ safety. A legislature or administrative
agency is far better suited to hosting a public discussion and balancing
competing social goals than a court considering the facts of a single
(and possibly exceptional) case.
Legislatures and agencies also have institutional strengths for
developing the law of corporate remote interference. Legislative action
to protect consumers is particularly effective when harms are diffuse
and small, imposed on a large number of people, and cannot be
attributed to a single source.397 This will often occur in the IoT context.
Meanwhile, agencies can develop specialized knowledge and expertise,
allowing them to address problems that arise with regard to a particular
technology or its use.398 If their mandate is sufficiently broad, agencies
can address harmful conduct that would not be covered under existing
tort law.399 They can remedy some of the information asymmetries
inherent to ex post tort litigation by requiring companies to disclose
information, and more expansive definitions of harm allow agencies to
take action to curb various kinds of corporate overreach and unfair,

395. See Eugene Volokh, Tort Law v. Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 879, 881–83 (2014).
396. See Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1809 (suggesting that IoT
companies may have an obligation to restrict the use of potentially dangerous property by
malicious or negligent users, as “a company’s ongoing control over a product could imply a
commensurate responsibility to restrict, by contractual or technological means, access by those
clearly incompetent to handle it”).
397. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Product Safety Regulation and the Law of Torts, in PRODUCT
LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT 151, 153
(1994).
398. Woodrow Hartzog has detailed the regulatory tools available to the FTC in the robotics
context, many of which also apply to issues raised by IoT devices. These include agencies’
extensive notice and disclosure jurisprudence; new theories of design and secondary liability,
under which companies may be liable for poor design choices or designs that allow others to
indirectly harm consumers; and robust data-security jurisprudence. Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair
and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 818–23 (2015). But see Lyndon, supra note 384, at 142
n.20 (discussing agency limitations in recognizing and addressing technical problems).
399. Cf. Hartzog, supra note 398, at 814 (“[T]he FTC can regulate consumer harms that fall
outside the scope of traditional torts and other regulatory efforts.”).
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deceptive, or abusive practices.400 Further, unlike consumer plaintiffs,
agencies are not bound by contractual fine print.401
Happily, there is no need to select one single medium of legal
evolution among courts, legislatures, and agencies; the various
rulemaking processes can coexist and supplement each other in
developing laws for corporate remote interference.402 In the absence of
legislative or agency action, courts can act as a stopgap.403 Meanwhile,
as exemplified in the climate-litigation context, targeted tort suits can
spur new legislation that systematically addresses an issue.404
Conversely, should courts neglect to address the harms of remote
interference, or do so in ways that do not incorporate broader policy
concerns, that failure may encourage other institutional responses.405
For example, legislatures regularly modify concerning tort
precedents.406 The different sources of regulation can also work
together to address outlier situations: statutes can address the majority
of cases and serve as a baseline framework for evaluating exceptional
fact patterns in tort cases, and tort standards can act as a supplemental
enforcement device for conduct that does not violate a statutory or
agency standard.407
400. Id. at 820 (“[T]he FTC is more capable of addressing small and nuanced changes in
design that affect consumers.”); Hoofnagle et al., supra note 291, at 185, 186–92 (arguing that
“[c]onsumer protection law is uniquely situated to vigorously pursue the maintenance of
functional free markets while upholding the benefits of consumer rights” and suggesting targeted
legal improvements, such as requiring sellers to disclose devices’ anticipated lifetimes and
enacting statutory right-to-repair laws).
401. Hartzog, supra note 398, at 817.
402. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 153–54; see also Lyndon, supra note 384, at 143
(noting that different sources of law “provide different procedural options or formats for
addressing the social costs of technical change”).
403. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 153.
404. Kysar, supra note 384, at 19.
405. Cf. WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 695–96 (detailing how workers’
compensation systems displaced common law regulation of nineteenth-century industrial
accidents); Kysar, supra note 33, at 49 (“[J]udges unabashedly and creatively forged a new body
of products liability law to respond to the rise of a mass consumer marketplace[, which] . . . had
the effect of protecting the common law from the kind of wholesale displacement that had
occurred in the case of worker injury.” (footnotes omitted)).
406. Examples include state statutes that determine when a minor must be held to the
standard of an adult, statutes that set standards for informed consent, punitive-damage caps for
malpractice, and standards of social-host liability. See, e.g., GOLDBERG, SEBOK & ZIPURSKY,
supra note 205, at 124 (discussing how, in response to Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal.
1968), the California legislature enacted a bill qualifying the California courts’ expansive
understanding of landowners’ potential duties towards trespassers).
407. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 153–54 (describing how the tort and regulatory
systems can best complement each other).
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2. Federal and State Lawmaking. The possibility of ex ante
regulatory action raises the question of whether these issues are better
addressed at the federal or state level.
There are some reasons to prefer federal regulation. National
standards usually make industry compliance easier, as an industry does
not need to tailor its practices to different rules in different states.
Federal regulation avoids the challenge that state-by-state laws might
place an undue burden on interstate commerce.408 Federal agencies
also may be better structured to regulate certain kinds of IoT devices,
such as IoT medical devices or IoT vehicles, given that they are already
aware of specific issues and governance structures associated with their
less-connected cousins.
Conversely, many of the issues this Article discusses relate to
consumer protection law, products liability law, and common law tort
duties—subjects that have traditionally been developed at the state
level. This might be an ideal space for states to serve as laboratories of
experimentation in anticipation of federal regulatory action.409 And, in
light of the current federal political gridlock, states are more likely to
operationalize this Article’s proposals.
Granted, state law will be most influential when compliance
requires a change at the hardware or physical-infrastructure level.
When a state law only governs software or the provision or termination
of a service, it will be relatively easy for companies to alter policies on
a state-by-state basis. Indeed, the connected nature of IoT devices will
allow companies to change how a particular device operates when it
crosses state or national boundaries.410
That being said, individual state laws will not necessarily result in
myriad contradictory standards; instead, state laws may create
consistent nation-wide best practices.411 For example, a California
408. But see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001) (“[T]he dormant Commerce Clause, properly understood,
leaves states with much more flexibility to regulate Internet transactions than is commonly
thought.”).
409. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
410. For a concise fictional consideration of the dystopian possibilities, see Cory Doctorow,
Sole and Despotic Dominion, REASON (Dec. 2018), https://reason.com/archives/2018/11/17/soleand-despotic-dominion [https://perma.cc/728U-YZ86].
411. See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 6 (1995) (discussing the “California Effect,” which refers
to “the critical role of powerful and wealthy ‘green’ political jurisdictions in promoting a ‘race to
the top’ among their trading partners . . . help[ing] drive many American regulations upward”);
Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 N.W.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (discussing the European
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requirement that starter-interrupt devices only trigger when the car is
parked within five miles of where it spends 60 percent of its time would
(1) demonstrate the feasibility of such a practice—which might be
relevant when courts across the country consider whether there is a
reasonable alternative design; (2) encourage companies forced to
invest in creating the technological infrastructure to implement the
practice nationally; and (3) influence both the market and tort law
nationally by shifting consumer expectations regarding IoT companies’
basic harm-prevention measures.
In short, both federal and state law approaches to regulating IoT
devices could result in a unified national standard, with agency
regulation offering the benefits of incorporating expertise and state
regulation offering the benefits of experimentation. Again, these two
approaches need not be mutually exclusive. Just as agency regulation
of unfair business practices can exist alongside state consumer
protection law, agency regulation of IoT devices can coexist with state
statutory and common law.
CONCLUSION
Most technological advances are incremental, and most laws are
sufficiently tech neutral to stretch to cover new developments. As a
result, most technological innovations cause little to no legal
disruption.412 Parking restrictions apply equally to human-driven and
self-parking cars; laws that ban bringing guns on airplanes cover both
industrially manufactured and 3D-printed firearms. From time to time,
however, a new technology will enable new kinds of conduct or
generate new negative externalities, which in turn create uncertainty
about the application of extant rules, expose or highlight existing
contradictions, or even undermine the fundamental assumptions of an
entire legal regime.413

Union’s similar effect on global regulations); Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William
McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law 6–10 (Univ. of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 19-25, Aug. 27, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433922
[https://perma.cc/3VU7-WQ3W] (discussing the “Delaware Effect,” “California Effect,” and
“Brussels Effect” in the context of privacy regulations).
412. Lyria Bennett Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change?, 8 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 589, 596 (2007) (“Despite occasional statements that some new technology
changes everything, legal problems stemming from technological change are relatively rare and
quite specific.” (footnote omitted)).
413. See generally Rebecca Crootof, Regulating New Weapons Technology, in THE IMPACT
OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 3, 6 (Eric Talbot Jensen &
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The Internet of Things creates a new relationship and power
dynamic between companies and consumers that is not anticipated by
our current civil-liability regime. By collecting personalized data and
maintaining an ongoing communications link, IoT devices allow
companies to provide a host of convenient, entertaining, and even lifesaving services. Simultaneously, IoT companies lock consumers into
contractual governance regimes and use IoT-enabled surveillance and
remote interference to enforce their rules, sometimes at the risk of
consumer safety. Meanwhile, rather than incentivizing IoT companies
to minimize foreseeable injuries, contract and tort law currently work
in tandem to shield IoT companies from liability.
A techlaw perspective helps situate this moment in a larger story,
highlighting the iterative relationship between law, society, and
technology. New technologies may create social change and legal
uncertainty, but law is a flexible tool that can evolve to address new,
tech-facilitated conduct. In the wake of the Industrial Revolution and
the associated increase in “stranger cases,” courts limited company
liability by creating the modern version of “negligence”; the rise of
mass production and cross-country transportation networks changed
seller–buyer relations and prompted the products liability revolution’s
reactionary expansion of industry liability.
IoT devices are yet another new technology that alters social and
power relations between industry and individuals, creating a potential
liability inflection point. Our choices now will determine whether law
evolves to preserve or constrain industry’s new, tech-enabled powers.
A conservative application of existing contract and tort law will result
in consumers continuing to bear the brunt of harms resulting from
corporate remote interference, and social norms and consumer
expectations will follow suit. Alternatively, expansive articulations and
applications of current doctrines could retain the benefits and more
fairly allocate the costs of this new technology going forward.

Ronald T.P. Alcala eds. 2019) (discussing “four ways in which a new technology can be legally
disruptive” through the lens of new weapons technologies).

